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USING OUTCOMES TO REFRAME  
GUILTY PLEA ADJUDICATION 
Anne R. Traum* 
Abstract 
The Supreme Court’s 2012 decisions in Lafler v. Cooper and 
Missouri v. Frye lay the groundwork for a new approach to judicial 
oversight of guilty pleas that considers outcomes. These cases confirm 
that courts possess robust authority to protect defendants’ Sixth 
Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel and that plea 
outcomes are particularly relevant to identifying and remedying 
prejudicial ineffective assistance in plea-bargaining. The Court’s 
reliance on outcome-based prejudice analysis and suggestions for trial 
court-level reforms to prevent Sixth Amendment violations set the stage 
for trial courts to take a more active, substantive role in regulating guilty 
pleas. 
This Article traces these significant doctrinal shifts and argues that 
they supply both impetus and authority for trial courts to regulate guilty 
pleas by monitoring plea outcomes. This proposal builds on market-
based concepts while strengthening the judicial role in safeguarding 
constitutional values. By monitoring outcomes, courts can detect and 
correct factors in the plea-bargaining market, such as prosecutorial 
overreaching and ineffective defense counsel, which can distort the 
parties’ ability to negotiate fair results. Outcomes monitoring is justified 
for practical reasons because it builds on courts’ expertise and unique 
place in the plea markets, it can be implemented at the trial court level, 
it reinforces courts’ traditional sentencing authority, and it can prevent 
litigation of prejudicial ineffective assistance in post-conviction 
proceedings.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court has signaled with its recent decisions in Lafler v. 
Cooper1 and Missouri v. Frye2 that its approach to judicial oversight of 
guilty pleas may be changing. In these cases, the Court for the first time 
looked to the outcome of the case—that is, the conviction and 
sentence—as critical to its analysis under Strickland v. Washington.3 
While technically these cases focused on incompetent defense counsel 
during plea-bargaining, their significance is broader. The Court appears 
to have recognized a need for greater regulation of plea-bargaining, 
considered procedural fairness (not just a reliable guilt determination) as 
a constitutional value, and relied on case outcomes to measure 
prejudice. These developments are key to the broader task of reframing 
guilty plea adjudication in ways that are practical and enhance 
constitutional norms.  
To appreciate their significance, it is necessary to situate Lafler and 
                                                                                                                     
 1. 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012). 
 2. 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012). 
 3. 466 U.S. 668, 687–96 (1984). 
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Frye in the broader, complex setting of our modern criminal justice 
system.4 Today, more defendants than ever before pass through the 
criminal justice system, are incarcerated, serve longer sentences, are 
subject to supervision, and experience lasting collateral consequences.5 
A key feature of this “system” is that prosecutors enjoy enormous 
power not only to control what criminal cases are prosecuted, but also to 
dictate through their charging and plea-bargaining decisions how cases 
are resolved in terms of guilt and sentencing.6 Substantive and 
procedural developments in the law have contributed to this growth in 
the system. Prosecutors gained a substantive edge through the 
enactment of tough drug laws and recidivist enhancements, greater 
reliance on prison sentences, and changes in sentencing law that 
constrained or even eliminated judicial discretion at sentencing.7 On the 
procedural side, prosecutors could use the threat of more serious 
charges or a reward of leniency to induce guilty pleas.8 
Together, these factors have contributed to higher guilty plea rates, 
especially because defendants who opt for trial typically face more 
serious charges with more severe sentencing consequences.9 Lafler is an 
                                                                                                                     
 4. Some scholars hail Lafler and Frye as landmark decisions, while others are more 
skeptical. Compare Justin F. Marceau, Embracing a New Era of Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1161, 1161 (2012) (describing Lafler and Frye as the dawn of a 
“new era”), with Albert W. Alschuler, Lafler and Frye: Two Small Band-Aids for a Festering 
Wound, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 673, 678–79 (2013) (expressing skepticism about their significance). 
 5. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 4, 11 (2010) (analogizing the racialized aspects of mass incarceration to 
historical features of racial segregation); David Garland, Introduction: The Meaning of Mass 
Imprisonment, in MASS IMPRISONMENT 1, 1–2 (David Garland ed., 2001); Marc Mauer, The 
Cases and Consequences of Prison Growth in the United States, in MASS IMPRISONMENT, supra, 
at 4, 6 (citing record numbers of drug arrests, and mandatory prison sentences at the federal and 
state levels); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Ham Sandwich Nation: Due Process When Everything Is 
a Crime, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 102, 104 (2013); Robert Weisberg & Joan Petersilia, The 
Dangers of Pyrrhic Victories Against Mass Incarceration, DAEDALUS, Summer 2010, at 124, 
124. 
 6. See Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Notice-and-Comment Sentencing, 97 
MINN. L. REV. 1, 8–9, 11 (2012) (describing how prosecutors control sentencing outcomes 
through charging and charge bargaining). 
 7. See Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 423, 429–30 
(2013) (summarizing policies that led to more prosecutions and longer prison sentences). 
 8. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360–61, 365 (1978) (holding that the 
prosecutor did not violate due process by carrying out a threat to charge an offense carrying a 
mandatory life sentence after the defendant rejected a more lenient plea offer). 
 9. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (quoting Rachel E. Barkow, 
Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1034 (2006)) (citing 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
STATISTICS ONLINE tbl. 5.22.2009, available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5222009. 
pdf; SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 226846, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE 
COURTS, 2006—STATISTICAL TABLES 1 (2009), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/
pdf/fssc06st.pdf). 
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example: After the defendant rejected a plea, he was convicted by a jury 
and received a sentence that was 3.5 times longer than the sentence he 
would have received with a guilty plea.10 High guilty plea rates allow 
prosecutors to efficiently handle a high-volume practice with very few 
trials, no juries, and minimal judicial oversight.11  
The Supreme Court in Lafler recognized that today our criminal 
justice system “is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of 
trials.”12 As a factual matter, this “system” has been the reality for a 
century.13 What is remarkable is that, with this statement, the Court has 
framed the major task ahead of reorienting constitutional criminal law 
to fit that reality. Currently, our “system of pleas” largely exists in a 
constitutional vacuum in which few plea-specific protections exist and 
none specifically address whether the defendant is receiving a fair 
deal.14 There is a wide gap between the elaborate protections afforded 
defendants at trial, and the bare-bones, “hands-off” process defendants 
receive when pleading guilty.15 Increasing regulation of guilty plea 
adjudication will necessarily require adapting or blending attributes 
from these two “systems.” 
Most constitutional criminal rights are procedural in nature and 
protect defendants at trial.16 These trial-focused protections evolved in a 
bygone era when trials were more common, prosecutions and 
incarceration rates were dramatically lower, and judges enjoyed 
virtually unfettered, unreviewable discretion to impose sentences.17 
Constitutional protections aimed to ensure that the trial was fair, that the 
jury’s verdict was accorded utmost respect, and that judges acted as 
                                                                                                                     
 10. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1383, 1391 (2012). 
 11. See Stephanos Bibas, Taming Negotiated Justice, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 35, 35 (2012) 
(describing how the Supreme Court has “blessed plea bargaining as a speedy, efficient way to 
clear congested dockets”). 
 12. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388.  
 13. See infra Subsection II.A.1. 
 14. See Stephanos Bibas, The Myth of the Fully Informed Rational Actor, 31 ST. LOUIS U. 
PUB. L. REV. 79, 79 (2011). 
 15. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to the defendant’s jury 
trial as the “exorbitant gold standard of American justice—a full-dress criminal trial with its 
innumerable constitutional and statutory limitations”); Bibas, supra note 15, at 79 (“[T]he Court 
has taken a laissez-faire, hands-off approach, assuming that plea bargaining is a rational and 
well-functioning market in which price signals obviate regulation.”). 
 16. See generally WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 
196–215 (2011) (describing the Supreme Court’s development of constitutional criminal 
procedure in the 1960s). 
 17. See id. at 39 (describing how fifty years ago, jury trials were “cheap,” “reasonably 
effective,” and “common”); Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Appellate Review of 
Sentencing Decisions, 60 ALA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2008) (noting that, until recent decades, appellate 
review of sentencing decisions “was non-existent in most cases”). 
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referees during trial with the final say on sentencing.18 To be sure, this 
procedural focus has its champions and critics.19 While imperfect, this 
elaborate procedural structure is an expression of core constitutional 
values about the limits of government power, the roles of judge and jury 
as checks on the government, and the norms of fairness, justice, and 
proportionality.  
In the system of pleas, there is no complementary, robust scheme of 
protections or expression of constitutional norms. In guilty plea 
adjudication, defendants do not so much exercise constitutional rights as 
convert them to bargaining chips to use in the plea-bargaining process.20 
By pleading guilty, a defendant waives his trial rights in return for a 
more certain, less severe outcome.21 As Professor Stephanos Bibas 
writes, the Supreme Court has taken a “laissez-faire, hands-off 
approach” to regulating plea-bargaining, in which courts play a 
perfunctory role in approving deals that are negotiated privately by the 
parties.22  
Plea-bargaining itself is complicated: It is ruled by institutional 
insiders, namely, prosecutors and defense counsel; many defendants are 
at the mercy of overburdened, underfunded appointed counsel; and 
defendants may lack access to important information about their plea 
options or find it difficult to weigh whether to accept a plea deal or risk 
trial.23 Despite the complexity of this process, court oversight is 
                                                                                                                     
 18. See Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 122 (2009) (“The jury’s deliberations are 
secret and not subject to outside examination.”); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) 
(establishing a high bar for reversal of a jury verdict based on insufficiency of the evidence); 
Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Recognizing Constitutional Rights at Sentencing, 
99 CALIF. L. REV. 47, 49 (2011) (observing that sentencing protections receive less attention 
than trial-focused constitutional protections).  
 19. See, e.g., Steven J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice, Local Democracy, and 
Constitutional Rights, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 1045–47 (2013) (reviewing STUNTZ, supra note 
16) (contrasting Stuntz’s “blistering indictment” of the “Warren Court[’s] revolution in criminal 
procedure,” and the indispensable role of court-enforced procedural safeguards in protecting 
liberty). 
 20. See George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 1066 (2000) 
(“[E]very new right [conferred by the courts] supplied a new axis along which a bargain could 
be struck.”); see also Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial Reforms, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 150, 172 (“The Warren Court’s failing was inventing gold-plated rules for 
criminal trials when in fact most defendants can and do waive those trial rights quite easily.”). 
 21. Fisher, supra note 20, at 965. 
 22. Bibas, supra note 14, at 79. 
 23. See STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 30–33 (2012) 
[hereinafter BIBAS, MACHINERY] (describing the dominance of institutional repeat players, 
namely prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges); Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-
Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 
1153–59 (2011) [hereinafter Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market] (describing 
measures that would assist defendants in better understanding their plea options and related 
consequences); John H. Blume, Plea Bargaining and the Right to the Effective Assistance of 
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typically limited to determining whether the defendant understands the 
terms of the deal he is accepting and the rights he is waiving.24 
Lafler and Frye begin the task of normalizing guilty plea 
adjudication within our existing constitutional framework. This Article 
traces this important shift at a doctrinal level, and examines how these 
cases provide a pathway for more robust judicial oversight of guilty 
pleas. Four features of this doctrinal shift are especially important to the 
broader project of reframing guilty plea adjudication. First, the Court 
recognized that ineffective assistance of counsel in the plea stage is 
actionable error in its own right, even if the resulting conviction is 
otherwise valid. Second, the Court applied an outcomes-based prejudice 
analysis to determine whether counsel’s deficient performance caused 
the defendant to be worse off. Third, the Court suggested that a 
prosecutor could be ordered to reoffer an earlier plea deal to remedy a 
constitutional violation. And finally, the Court suggested that trial 
courts could do more to prevent prejudicial error by counsel at the trial 
stage.  
This Article shows how Lafler and Frye create pathways for judicial 
oversight of plea outcomes at the trial stage under the Sixth Amendment 
and based on separation of powers concerns. Part I describes the Court’s 
traditional procedural, outcome-neutral approach to regulation of pleas 
under the Due Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel, and its recent shifts in thinking on guilty plea adjudication 
reflected in Lafler and Frye. Part II places reform of guilty plea 
adjudication into a broader context by considering plea market features 
and proposals for reform. Plea-bargaining is deeply entrenched, mostly 
unregulated, and highly adaptive. This means that increased oversight of 
guilty pleas may change the substantive outcome of particular cases, but 
is unlikely (absent other changes) to alter the overall rate of pleas. 
Proposals to reform or better regulate guilty pleas tend either to insist on 
the need for strengthening constitutional protections or procedures, or to 
build on the market model in which prosecutors and defendants are 
viewed as rational actors freely bargaining to acceptable results. Finally, 
Part III proposes that courts should monitor guilty plea outcomes to 
safeguard separation of powers and Sixth Amendment concerns and 
describes how courts might implement this approach. This proposal 
situates judges as constitutional actors in the plea market with authority 
to ensure that outcomes are not unfairly distorted by prosecutorial 
advantage or ineffective counsel. This focus on outcomes is sensitive to 
the reality of the plea marketplace, while safeguarding core 
constitutional values.  
                                                                                                                     
Counsel: Where the Rubber Hits the Road in Capital Cases, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 122, 123 
(2012) (suggesting that defendants require competent counsel to help the defendants appreciate 
trial risks and plea offer benefits). 
 24. Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 23, at 1142. 
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I.  THE COURT’S PROCEDURAL APPROACH 
Guilty pleas have been the dominant mode of guilt adjudication for a 
century, but courts play a limited role in regulating them. Though the 
Supreme Court views plea-bargaining as an “indispensible” feature of 
the modern criminal justice system, it has regulated pleas with a light 
touch by requiring courts to directly question defendants to ascertain 
that they understand the plea terms and the rights they waive by 
admitting guilt.25 By its terms, plea-bargaining connotes that the 
defendant gets some “bargain” or concession on the charge or sentence 
he is facing in exchange for pleading guilty.26 Pleading guilty is a 
procedural choice (self-conviction in lieu of trial) that comes with 
substantive consequences, most importantly, a conviction and 
sentence.27 Regulating this process is a complex task in part because it 
combines the distinct phases of adjudication—charging, guilt 
adjudication, and sentencing. Although these phases may still exist as 
formally separate proceedings, as a practical matter they may be 
wrapped into the guilty plea terms that were privately negotiated, 
outside the courtroom, with little judicial oversight. For example, 
though courts routinely impose sentences at a separate hearing after the 
guilty plea is accepted, the sentence imposed may have been set or 
influenced by the terms of the guilty plea.28 
The Court’s procedural approach to regulating pleas rests on three 
constitutional components: prosecutorial discretion, due process, and 
right to counsel. Because prosecutors control charging, the Court has 
been reluctant on separation of powers grounds to regulate aggressive 
charge bargaining and threats in the plea-negotiation phase that are the 
carrot and stick used to induce guilty pleas.29 Instead, the Court has 
primarily reviewed the validity of guilty pleas under the Due Process 
Clause and required trial courts to complete a procedural checklist to 
ensure that the defendant understands the trial rights he is waiving, as 
                                                                                                                     
 25. See United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 82–83 (2004); Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242–43 (1969) (“[A] plea of guilty is more than an admission of 
conduct; it is a conviction.”). 
 26. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (“Plea bargaining flows from ‘the 
mutuality of advantage’ to defendants and prosecutors, each with his own reasons for wanting to 
avoid trial.” (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970))); BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1270 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a “plea bargain” as an “agreement . . . whereby the 
defendant pleads guilty . . . in exchange for some concession by the prosecutor, usu. a more 
lenient sentence or a dismissal of the other charges”). 
 27. See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242–43. 
 28. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 (describing presentence report considerations, objections 
to the presentence report, and sentencing hearing). 
 29. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (noting that prosecutorial 
decisions are generally left to the broad discretion of prosecutors). 
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well as the plea terms and its consequences.30 The Court has trusted that 
because a defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel, the 
counsel will aid the defendant in protecting the defendant’s interests 
during plea-bargaining.31  
Together, these constitutional components reinforce a plea-
bargaining model that involves minimal judicial oversight. In this 
model, prosecutors have broad discretion to charge and charge-bargain. 
Courts assume that represented defendants can protect their own 
interests in negotiations. And courts merely ensure that defendants 
understand the terms and consequences of their guilty pleas. This 
system relies on competent counsel, and the Court has long recognized 
that incompetent counsel can invalidate a guilty plea.32 As a practical 
matter, however, the guarantee of effective assistance during plea 
negotiations has only indirectly impacted plea bargains because 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims are relegated to post-conviction 
proceedings33 and concerns about counsel are not part of the guilty plea 
routine.  
Lafler and Frye open the door for courts to consider concerns about 
counsel before the plea is accepted and avoid prejudicial disparities 
attributable to incompetent counsel. As this Article traces below, these 
decisions erode the traditional divide between due process and right to 
counsel analysis, rely on the substantive outcome of the case (the 
conviction and sentence) to assess prejudice, and highlight that trial 
courts are the locus of reforming guilty plea adjudication. 
A.  Regulating the Validity of a Guilty Plea 
In regulating guilty pleas, the Supreme Court has developed minimal 
due process safeguards and mostly deferred to counsel and the plea-
                                                                                                                     
 30. See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243–44 (“What is at stake for an accused facing death or 
imprisonment demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the 
matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and 
of its consequence.”); see also Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 644–45 & n.13 (1976) 
(stating that a plea cannot be voluntary in the constitutional sense unless the defendant 
understands both the nature of the constitutional rights he is waiving and the nature of the 
charge against him). 
 31. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971) (stating that constitutional 
consideration of the process of plea-bargaining presupposes fairness, secured in part by the right 
to counsel). 
 32. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480–81 (2010); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 
56 (1985); see also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970) (upholding the validity of 
a guilty plea as voluntarily and intelligently made when defendants were sufficiently advised by 
competent counsel). 
 33. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are typically asserted in post-conviction 
proceedings because the claim requires additional factual development, see Massaro v. United 
States, 538 U.S. 500, 505 (2003), or because state post-conviction rules preclude such claims on 
direct appeal, see Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1320 (2012). 
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bargaining market as to the substance or outcome of the negotiations.34 
The Court’s stated reasons for constitutionalized guilty plea procedures 
reflect concerns about judicial oversight, transparency, unjust outcomes, 
and finality. Overall, concerns about prosecutorial overreaching and the 
coercive nature of plea-bargaining have taken a back seat to efficiency. 
The Court has trusted that the plea-bargaining market and counsel will 
ensure that pleas are proportional, accurate, and just.35 
The Court’s seminal decision in Boykin v. Alabama36 
constitutionalized the guilty plea procedure and highlighted important 
concerns about the practice. The defendant in Boykin was charged with 
five counts of robbery (a capital offense).37 With appointed counsel, he 
pled guilty to all five counts just three days later, and was sentenced to 
death.38 The Court acknowledged in Boykin that the “majority” of 
convictions are obtained by guilty plea, but expressed concern about the 
lack of judicial inquiry surrounding the defendant’s decision to plead 
guilty to a death sentence so quickly.39 The “record [was] wholly 
silent,” the Court said, on why a guilty plea was “the desirable 
course.”40 Though defense counsel may have had valid reasons for 
advising the defendant to plead guilty, the Court intoned, the lack of a 
record, the speed at which the defendant entered the plea, and the 
severity of the sentence were troubling.41 The Supreme Court faulted 
the trial court for accepting a plea in a capital case with “no questions” 
asked.42  
Boykin fostered transparency, efficiency, and finality in the guilty 
plea process. At its core, the Court affirmed judicial authority to review 
the constitutionality of a guilty plea and injected the procedure with 
constitutional norms, most notably a fully informed, on-the-record, 
personal waiver of constitutional procedural rights. Because judicial 
review requires a record, the Court required trial courts to make a record 
by canvassing the defendant to establish that his guilty plea is knowing, 
                                                                                                                     
 34. Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 23, at 1142 (describing the 
role of judges in plea-bargaining as “passive and reactive”). 
 35. Id. 
 36. 395 U.S. 238 (1969). 
 37. Id. at 239. 
 38. Id. at 239–40. 
 39. Id. at 244 n.7. 
 40. Id. at 240. 
 41. See id. at 239–40, 243–44. 
 42. Compare id. at 239 (“no questions”), with id. at 244 (quoting with approval the 
Supreme Court of Alabama’s dissenting justices’ statement of the law “that there was reversible 
error ‘because the record does not disclose that the defendant voluntarily and understandingly 
entered his pleas of guilty’” (quoting Boykin v. State, 207 So. 2d 412, 415 (Ala. 1968) 
(Goodwyn, J., dissenting))). 
832 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
 
intelligent, and voluntary.43 That meant that courts need to ascertain that 
the defendant understands his procedural choice, the constitutional 
rights he is waiving by pleading guilty and forgoing trial (the rights 
against self-incrimination, to jury trial, and to confront accusers), as 
well as the substantive impact, particularly the plea terms and 
sentencing exposure.44  
 Providing for some judicial review legitimized and regularized 
guilty pleas as well as cemented their finality. A judicially supervised, 
recorded plea injected transparency into what the Court described as a 
“previously clandestine practice.”45 The required judicial canvass of the 
defendant about the guilty plea, though critiqued as “hasty and rote” 
today, signified that the solemnity and finality of the proceeding 
required this direct contact between the court and the defendant.46 The 
Court made clear in Boykin that the need for finality was a driving 
concern: having a contemporaneous record of the plea was intended to 
“forestall[] the spin-off of collateral proceedings that seek to probe 
murky memories.”47 Thus, the recorded guilty plea canvass would 
provide courts a specific, constitutional role and prevent cases from 
reappearing in post-conviction proceedings. 
While Boykin established the Court’s procedural approach to 
regulating pleas, concerns began to surface about the substance of those 
bargains, separation of powers, and the role of trial court judges. As 
mentioned, the Boykin Court was concerned as a matter of process and 
outcome that the defendant pled guilty to crimes carrying the death 
penalty just three days after being charged, with “no questions” asked 
by the judge.48 The Court observed that criminal convictions demand 
more of courts, specifically, that “an accused facing death or 
imprisonment demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are 
capable in canvassing the matter with the accused.”49 
Despite voicing these concerns, in subsequent decisions the Court 
seemed content to leave the substance of plea bargains to the parties and 
                                                                                                                     
 43. Id. at 243–44. 
 44. See id. at 243 & n.5. The Court further required in Henderson v. Morgan that the 
defendant understand the essential elements of the offense, the nature of the charges as they 
relate to the facts, and admit facts sufficient to support the conviction. 426 U.S. 637, 645–47 
(1976) (invalidating second-degree murder conviction where defendant was not informed about 
an intent to kill, an essential element of the offense). 
 45. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362 (1978) (citing Brady v. United States, 397 
U.S. 742, 758 (1970)). 
 46. Laura I. Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 IND. L.J. 731, 733 (2010) (“Guilty pleas, 
although indispensible to the smooth processing of criminal justice, have become hasty and 
rote . . . .”); see Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243–44. 
 47. 395 U.S. at 244 & n.7 (advising that a detailed plea canvass is necessary “[i]f these 
convictions are to be insulated from attack”). 
 48. Id. at 239. 
 49. Id. at 243–44.  
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ratified the use of hardball tactics by prosecutors to induce a guilty 
plea.50 The Court has assumed that prosecutors and defense counsel 
“possess relatively equal bargaining power,” and that plea-bargaining 
benefits both sides.51 Defendants plead guilty, commonly, to avoid a 
harsher sentence or more serious charges.52 The state benefits from a 
quick and final conviction, which allows it to conserve scarce 
prosecutorial and judicial resources.53 It is this “mutuality of advantage” 
to both sides—certainty and convenience for the prosecutor and the 
prospect of a better outcome for the defendant—that explains why most 
defendants plead guilty.54 In Brady, the Court rejected the defendant’s 
claim that his plea was involuntary because it was entered to avoid the 
death penalty.55 Only actual or threatened physical harm or overbearing 
mental coercion, the Court stated, would render the plea involuntary.56 
Pleading guilty to avoid the threat of an increased penalty, even death, 
was deemed a legitimate and noncoercive reason to forgo trial and did 
not render the plea invalid.57  
The Court approved the prosecutor’s use of aggressive charge-
bargaining tactics to induce a guilty plea.58 Bordenkircher v. Hayes 
presented the thorny question of whether a prosecutor violated due 
process by threatening to bring more serious charges if the defendant 
rejected a plea offer.59 Prosecutors enjoy virtually unfettered discretion 
in charging, so long as the charges are not discriminatory and are 
supported by probable cause.60 In Bordenkircher, the defendant, a two-
                                                                                                                     
 50. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364 (“[T]his Court has necessarily accepted as 
constitutionally legitimate the simple reality that the prosecutor’s interest at the bargaining table 
is to persuade the defendant to forgo his right to plead not guilty.”); Brady, 397 U.S. at 750 
(holding that the defendant’s fear of the death penalty did not rise to the level that would 
invalidate his guilty plea). 
 51. Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 6, at 8–9 (citing Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 362; 
Brady, 397 U.S. at 752–53). 
 52. Brady, 397 U.S. at 749–50 (observing that many defendants plead guilty to get a more 
lenient sentence, to get reduced or dismissed charges, to gain certainty, and avoid the “agony 
and expense” of trial). 
 53. See id. at 752 (prosecutorial resources). 
 54. Id. at 752 & n.10 (citing DONALD J. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF 
GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 3 & n.1 (1966) (noting that, at that time, guilty pleas 
accounted for the vast majority of convictions, some 90–95% of all convictions and 70–85% of 
felony convictions)). 
 55. Id. at 758. 
 56. Id. at 748. 
 57. Id. at 750 (narrowly defining coercion, i.e., if the state used “actual or threatened 
physical harm or by mental coercion overbearing the will of the defendant”). 
 58. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 358–59, 365 (1978) (allowing the threat of 
life imprisonment as “a legitimate use of available leverage in the plea-bargaining process”). 
 59. Id. at 358. 
 60. Id. at 364 (“[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused 
committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what 
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time felon, was charged with check forgery, which carried a statutory 
range of two to ten years.61 The prosecutor offered to recommend a 
five-year prison term if the defendant pled guilty as charged.62 If not, 
the prosecutor threatened to indict him under Kentucky’s habitual 
offender statute, which carried a mandatory life term.63 The defendant 
rejected the offer, was indicted on the habitual charge, convicted by a 
jury, and sentenced to life in prison.64 The Court held that the 
prosecutor did not violate due process by threatening (and then 
charging) the defendant with a mandatory life sentence offense for 
refusing to accept a plea offer.65  
Bordenkircher highlights how charge-bargaining collapses three 
formally distinct adjudication phases: charging, guilt adjudication, and 
sentencing. In trial adjudication, these discrete tasks are performed by 
different institutional actors—prosecutors charge (with minimal judicial 
or grand jury oversight), juries or judges convict, and judges impose the 
sentence. These separate institutional roles operate as a check (by the 
court or a jury) on the executive powers to charge, convict, and 
imprison.66 In the plea context, the prosecutor may effectively control 
all three functions—charging, adjudication, and sentencing—displacing 
the role of judge and jury.67 Bordenkircher also shows the draconian 
sentencing consequences—the trial penalty—a defendant may suffer by 
proceeding to trial.68 The Court sanctioned such charging tactics.69 
                                                                                                                     
charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.”), quoted 
with approval in United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996); Inmates of Attica Corr. 
Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 379 (2d Cir. 1973) (dismissing a complaint seeking 
mandamus relief to compel prosecution despite allegations which raised “serious 
questions . . . as to the protection of the civil rights and physical security of a definable class of 
victims of crime and as to the fair administration of the criminal justice system”); see also U.S. 
CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law . . . .”). 
 61. 434 U.S. at 358. 
 62. Id. at 358–59.  
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 359. 
 65. Id. at 365. 
 66. See Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 
989, 996–97 (2006). 
 67. Id. at 997, 1017. 
 68. Cf. William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2561 (2004) (noting that state judges, who are elected by the same 
voters as prosecutors, have an incentive to impose penalties on defendants who wish to go to 
trial); Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 
154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 84–86 (2005) (arguing that federal prosecutors have become increasingly 
able to threaten large penalties for going to trial and to promise large rewards for pleading 
guilty). 
 69. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 358–59, 365 (holding that the prosecutor did not violate 
due process by carrying out his threat to seek a mandatory life term against a defendant who 
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The Court’s deference in Bordenkircher to prosecutorial charging 
decisions and market forces is justified, nominally, on its particular 
framing of separation of powers.70 Because the prosecutor decides what 
charges to bring and when to bring them, the Court reasoned, it made no 
difference whether the prosecutor obtained an indictment on the 
habitual offender charge at the outset or later, as a lever in plea-
bargaining.71 Discouraging the defendant from exercising his right to 
trial was an “inevitable,” “permissible,” and “constitutionally 
legitimate” attribute of a system that tolerates and encourages guilty 
pleas.72 Bordenkircher ensured that guilty pleas would be prosecutor 
controlled, with minimal judicial oversight.73 
The dissenters in Bordenkircher voiced concern about the lack of 
transparency and coercive effect of unchecked charge-bargaining.74 The 
Court of Appeals held that a prosecutor could bargain down from the 
original charge but could not penalize a defendant for exercising his 
right to trial, as the defendant had done.75 Justice Harold Blackmun, in 
his dissenting opinion, recognized that such a rule (rejected by the 
majority) would lead prosecutors to stack higher charges at the outset, 
leaving defendants in the worse position of trying to secure release and 
bargain for lower charges.76 But fixing charges at the outset would 
create transparency and interpose regular checks on prosecutors’ 
charging decisions. This was a preferable rule, he argued, for three 
reasons: (1) the charging decision would be made independent of 
knowing the defendant’s willingness to plead and not used as a plea-
bargaining hammer; (2) it would “keep charging practices visible to the 
general public” by requiring the prosecutor to “lay his cards on the table 
with an indictment of public record at the beginning of the bargaining 
process”; and (3) it would eliminate concerns about whether the grand 
                                                                                                                     
rejected a plea offer). 
 70. Id. at 364–65 (noting that the charging decision rests entirely in the prosecutor’s 
discretion, though “there are undoubtedly constitutional limits upon its exercise”). 
 71. Id. at 360–61 (“As a practical matter, in short, this case would be no different if the 
grand jury had indicted Hayes as a recidivist from the outset, and the prosecutor had offered to 
drop that charge as part of the plea bargain.”). 
 72. Id. at 364. The Court distinguished this trial penalty from a line of earlier cases in 
which the prosecutor penalized a defendant with new, more serious charges for successfully 
appealing his conviction. Id. at 362–63 (distinguishing Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27–28 
(1974); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969), overruled on other grounds by 
Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989)). 
 73. William J. Stuntz, Bordenkircher v. Hayes: Plea Bargaining and the Decline of the 
Rule of Law, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 351, 375–76 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006). 
 74. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 368 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 75. Hayes v. Cowan, 547 F.2d 42, 44–45 (6th Cir. 1976), rev’d sub nom. Bordenkircher, 
434 U.S. 357. 
 76. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 368 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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jury would actually indict for the greater charges.77 Justice Blackmun 
also argued that after the defendant was indicted on the higher charge, 
he should have been given a final chance to accept the plea bargain.78 
Added transparency and accountability would at least make the choice 
of pleading guilty more clear to the defendant, the public, and the court. 
While embracing a prosecutor-controlled market approach, the 
Bordenkircher Court sidelined concerns about prosecutorial 
overreaching and substantive fairness. Justice Lewis F. Powell, also 
writing in dissent, argued that the “result” was unjust and the 
prosecutor’s tactics violated due process.”79 The prosecutor’s actions 
violated due process, Justice Powell wrote, because “their admitted 
purpose was to discourage and then to penalize with unique severity 
[the defendant’s] exercise of constitutional rights.”80 The majority 
Court, however, dismissed these concerns and ruled that the lower court 
was “mistaken” in holding that the “substance of the plea offer itself 
violated” due process.81  
In contrast to the values expressed in Boykin, in Brady and 
Bordenkircher the Court sanctioned prosecutors’ reliance on aggressive 
charge bargaining to induce a guilty plea. Boykin’s procedural approach 
was based on core constitutional values: transparency, judicial review, 
and substantive fairness. Brady and Bordenkircher appeared to undercut 
those values. The Court welcomed aggressive plea-bargaining tactics 
without regard to how they might distort the defendant’s conviction and 
sentence. The role of competent defense counsel was important to the 
Court’s embrace of this guilty plea system, but the Court’s efforts to 
guarantee that right were limited. 
B.  Regulating Defense Counsel in the Plea Phase 
Another essential component of the Court’s historic procedural 
approach to plea bargaining was its assumption that defense counsel 
would protect the defendant’s interests in plea bargaining.82 On this 
assumption, the Court allowed plea-bargaining to be a party-driven and 
private process without court oversight. In Hill v. Lockhart83 the Court 
recognized a defendant’s right to the effective assistance of counsel 
                                                                                                                     
 77. Id. at 368 n.2. 
 78. Id. at 369 n.2. 
 79. Id.at 368–69 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 80. Id. at 373. 
 81. Id. at 362 (majority opinion) (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751 n.8 
(1970)). 
 82. See Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 646–47 (1976); see also Bordenkircher, 434 
U.S. at 362; McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770–71 (1970); Brady, 397 U.S. at 749. 
 83. 474 U.S. 52 (1985).  
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during plea-bargaining.84 Specifically, Hill permitted defendants 
convicted by guilty plea to challenge their convictions by claiming they 
were denied the right to effective assistance of counsel pursuant to 
Strickland v. Washington, which governs a challenge to a conviction 
based on ineffective assistance of counsel.85 It was significant that Hill 
recognized an important constitutional basis to challenge a guilty plea 
conviction under the Sixth Amendment based on incompetent counsel. 
But Hill’s reach was limited in part because it framed the inquiry so 
narrowly. Today, Strickland continues to provide the governing 
standard, but the Court’s recent decisions in Lafler and Frye apply 
Strickland more flexibly.  
Hill opened the door to new challenges to guilty plea convictions 
and increased judicial oversight of plea-bargaining. In Hill the 
defendant complained that his plea was invalid because his lawyer 
misinformed him about the sentencing consequences of pleading 
guilty.86 The defendant, who was facing a possible life sentence, pled 
guilty in exchange for the prosecutor’s agreement to recommend a term 
of thirty-five years, which the court later imposed.87 The court and 
defense counsel informed the defendant that he would need to complete 
at least one-third of his sentence to become eligible for parole.88 Due to 
a prior felony conviction, however, the defendant later learned that he 
would need to serve one-half of his sentence before he was parole 
eligible.89 Though the Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s claim,90 
it established that Strickland applies to challenges to guilty pleas based 
on ineffective assistance of counsel.91  
Hill greatly expanded the Court’s review of guilty pleas and its 
exposure to plea-bargaining realities. To prevail under the Strickland 
standard, the defendant in Hill was required to prove that “but for [his] 
counsel’s errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted 
on going to trial.”92 To evaluate the Strickland claim, the Court needed 
to probe off-the-record, behind-the-scenes activities and conversations 
that led counsel to recommend the plea, or fail to develop alternatives.93 
                                                                                                                     
 84. Id. at 56–57 (“[A] defendant who pleads guilty upon the advice of counsel ‘may only 
attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he 
received from counsel was not within the standards set forth in McMann.’” (quoting Tollett v. 
Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973))). 
 85. 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984). 
 86. Hill, 474 U.S. at 53. 
 87. Id. at 54. 
 88. Id. at 54–55. 
 89. Id. at 55. 
 90. Id. at 60. 
 91. Id. at 57–59. 
 92. Id. at 59. 
 93. Id. (noting that the inquiry may include whether counsel failed to investigate or 
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Such evidence might include the history of plea offers, the strength of 
the evidence against the defendant, his possible defenses, risks 
associated with trial, and counsel’s investigation, communication, and 
advice.94 The Boykin inquiry focuses primarily on the trial court record, 
especially the plea canvass and sentencing hearing.95 So, while courts 
generally left plea negotiations to the parties without judicial oversight, 
Hill provided courts a window into this phase of the case.  
For practical and doctrinal reasons, however, Hill’s impact was 
limited and understanding those limitations is important to appreciating 
the impact of Lafler and Frye. Three key features limited Hill’s scope. 
First, Hill tethered the ineffective assistance claim to due process 
analysis. Second, it hinged the prejudice analysis on a procedural choice 
(pleading guilty versus proceeding to trial). Third, like trial-based 
Strickland claims, it relegated complaints about deficient counsel to 
post-conviction proceedings with the remedy of a new trial. As I discuss 
below, Lafler and Frye alter each of these features and provide a 
broader, more flexible approach to redressing ineffective assistance of 
counsel during plea negotiations. 
The first limitation is that Hill expressly linked the validity of the 
plea (a due process concern96) to counsel’s performance (a Sixth 
Amendment concern97). Before Hill, the Court repeatedly 
acknowledged the critical role of defense counsel in plea-bargaining and 
suggested that defense counsel’s erroneous advice during the plea phase 
might be grounds to attack the voluntariness, and thus, the validity, of a 
plea.98 The Court connected these dots in Hill and relied on Strickland 
                                                                                                                     
discover potentially exculpatory evidence or failed to advise the defendant of available 
affirmative defenses). 
 94. Id.; see, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 360–61 (1978) (evaluating the 
defendant’s trial risks); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 744–45, 749–50, 756 (1970) 
(evaluating counsel’s communication with the defendant and the defendant’s trial risks). 
 95. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 240 (1969) (noting that “the record [was] wholly 
silent” on defense counsel’s “[t]rial strategy”); id. at 243–44 (noting that the “stake for a[] 
[defendant] facing death or imprisonment demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are 
capable in canvassing the [plea] with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of 
what the plea connotes and of its consequences”); id. at 244 (“When the judge discharges th[e] 
[plea canvassing] function, he leaves a record adequate for any review that may later be 
sought.”); Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 362 (noting that “[t]he open acknowledgement” of plea 
negotiations “has led th[e] Court to recognize . . . the need for a public record indicating a plea 
was knowingly and voluntarily made”); Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 642–43 (1976) 
(focusing on the defendant’s “direct colloquy with the trial judge” at the plea hearing and 
statements at sentencing); id. at 639–40 (considering the evidentiary hearing testimony of the 
defendant, the defense attorneys, the prosecutor, and others). 
 96. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 97. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (recognizing a standard for 
“reasonably effective assistance” based on the Sixth Amendment). 
 98. See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363 (1978) (“Defendants advised by competent 
counsel and protected by other procedural safeguards are presumptively capable of intelligent 
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to provide the Sixth Amendment analysis. In Hill the Court established 
that ineffective assistance of counsel could undermine the validity of the 
guilty plea because the “voluntariness of the plea depends on whether 
counsel’s advice” was reasonable.99 Thus, the Court’s inquiry in Hill (as 
in Boykin) tests the validity of the guilty plea (a due process issue) with 
an expanded scope.  
A second limitation on Hill’s reach is that it hinges Strickland 
analysis on a procedural choice: whether to plead guilty or go to trial. 
Strickland framed its prejudice test broadly: whether, but for counsel’s 
deficient performance, “there is a reasonable probability that . . . the 
result of the proceeding would have been different.”100 This test 
contemplates a different substantive outcome. Hill narrowed the 
question to a procedural one: The defendant needed to show that “but 
for counsel’s errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have 
insisted on going to trial.”101 This binary, procedural choice approach—
plead guilty or go to trial—departed from Strickland’s substantive 
assessment of prejudice. Proving that a defendant would have insisted 
on going to trial is difficult and risky. It is difficult to prove because 
many defendants are deciding among plea offers, but not contemplating 
trial, which requires a viable defense and risks harsher penalties.102 And 
success itself is risky because the standard remedy for a Hill claim is to 
withdraw the plea and restore the defendant to his pre-plea status—that 
is, facing trial.103  
Third, aside from its limited doctrinal scope, practical aspects of Hill 
rendered the right of effective assistance of counsel in plea-bargaining 
                                                                                                                     
choice in response to prosecutorial persuasion [in plea-bargaining], and unlikely to be driven to 
false self-condemnation.” (emphasis added)); Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 647 (1976) 
(holding that the defendant’s plea was involuntary where “the trial judge found . . . that the 
element of intent was not explained to respondent,” but suggesting that defense counsel’s failure 
to “explain the nature of the offense in sufficient detail to give the [defendant] notice of what he 
is being asked to admit” might be grounds to attack the voluntariness of the plea); McMann v. 
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770–72 (1970) (discussing the intelligence and voluntariness of 
guilty pleas in relationship to the competency of counsel’s advice); Brady v. United States, 397 
U.S. 742, 749 (1970) (affirming the lower court’s “finding of voluntariness” where defendant, 
“advised by competent counsel,” decided to plead guilty). 
 99. 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (citing McMann, 397 U.S. at 771). 
 100. Id. at 57 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 
 101. Id. at 59. 
 102. Cf. id. at 60 (holding that “the District Court did not err in declining to hold a hearing 
on petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim” because “petitioner’s allegations [were] 
insufficient to satisfy the Strickland v. Washington requirement of ‘prejudice’”). 
 103. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010) (holding that “[t]he nature of relief 
secured by a successful collateral challenge to a guilty plea [is] an opportunity to withdraw the 
plea and proceed to trial”); see also Margaret Love & Gabriel J. Chin, The “Major Upheaval” 
of Padilla v. Kentucky: Extending the Right to Counsel to the Collateral Consequences of 
Conviction, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2010, at 36, 39–40. 
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an underenforced guarantee. Typically, defendants can only make a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during post-conviction 
proceedings,104 which often take years.105 This means that only 
defendants with longer sentences have the time to pursue Hill claims to 
completion.106 In the pursuit of such claims, there is no right to 
counsel,107 and showing deficient performance and prejudice often 
requires developing facts outside the record and an evidentiary 
hearing.108 Further, procedural rules and deferential review standards 
pose significant barriers to relief.109 The record and client file in a guilty 
plea case are usually far less developed than in cases that went to trial, 
and the judge handling the ineffective assistance of counsel claim may 
be less familiar with the defendant since there was no trial.110 Thus, 
postponing Sixth Amendment scrutiny until the post-conviction phase 
means that many defendants simply cannot bring or win such claims.  
Importantly, Hill did not alter plea-bargaining or guilty plea 
                                                                                                                     
 104. Louis D. Bilionis & Richard A. Rosen, Lawyers, Arbitrariness, and the Eighth 
Amendment, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1303 (1997). 
 105. The time needed to litigate a federal habeas action, six to seven years, far exceeds the 
median sentence of about seventeen months and the average sentence length of about three years 
and two months. NANCY J. KING ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, FINAL TECHNICAL 
REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS 55, 56 & tbl. 13 (2007), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf (finding that, on average, it takes all 
federal habeas noncapital petitioners over six years to file a petition in federal court and 11.5 
months for the court’s decision); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE tbl. 5.48.2006, http://www.albany.edu/
sourcebook/pdf/t5482006.pdf (finding that the mean and median incarceration sentence lengths 
for all felony offenses in state courts in 2006 is, respectively, thirty-eight months and seventeen 
months). 
 106. See KING ET AL., supra note 105, at 20 (finding that, for noncapital cases, 27.7% of 
habeas petitioners had a life sentence, while the remainder had an average sentence of twenty 
years). 
 107. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (“We have never held that prisoners 
have a constitutional right to counsel when mounting collateral attacks upon their 
convictions . . . .” (citing Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 488 (1969))). 
 108. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1405 (2012) (discussing the defendant’s post-
conviction “testi[mony that] he would have entered a guilty plea to [a] misdemeanor had he 
known about the offer”); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1389 (2012) (noting that a court 
may hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the defendant has shown prejudice). 
 109. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012); Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785–86 
(2011) (discussing deference to state courts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)); see also Anne R. 
Traum, Last Best Chance for the Great Writ: Equitable Tolling and Federal Habeas Corpus, 68 
MD. L. REV. 545, 547 n.7, 558, 585 n.215 (2009) (describing procedural default, exhaustion, and 
timing rules in federal habeas review). 
 110. Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 6, at 10 (observing that trial court judges are 
unfamiliar with the facts of a guilty plea case because there has been no trial). Such off-the-
record evidence must be developed at an evidentiary hearing, which in federal habeas review is 
rare. See KING ET AL., supra note 105, at 35–36 (noting that, in U.S. District Courts, evidentiary 
hearings were held in 0.4% of noncapital habeas corpus cases, and around 10% of capital cases).  
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procedures. Hill created a new basis to challenge a guilty plea, and 
exposed judges to the ingredients, including deficient counsel, that 
influence plea-bargaining. As a practical matter, Hill did little to alter 
the status quo for the majority of defendants who plead guilty.  
C.  Frye and Lafler: Incorporating Outcomes Analysis 
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Frye and Lafler bring 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims into the modern era by shifting 
the focus toward plea-bargaining and outcomes. The Court’s analysis in 
Hill focused on the validity of the plea and the defendant’s procedural 
choice of whether to plead guilty or go to trial. Though Strickland 
prejudice analysis tests whether the result of the proceeding would have 
been different, in Hill that analysis seemed to turn more on the 
adjudication process than the sentence. Frye and Lafler take a different 
tract, reflecting that process choices and sentencing outcomes are 
integrally related. These cases establish that a Sixth Amendment 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim does not turn on whether the 
conviction is invalid or the defendant’s procedural choice to plead 
guilty or go to trial. Instead, the Court in Lafler and Frye focused on 
whether counsel’s incompetence affected the outcome—the substantive 
result.111 The Court also considered practical concerns about remedies 
and reform, suggesting that trial courts have a greater role to play than it 
previously acknowledged.112  
In Lafler and Frye, the Court established three key doctrinal points: 
(1) a Strickland claim is independent of other constitutional claims and 
may succeed even though the conviction is valid; (2) the focus of 
Strickland prejudice is whether counsel’s deficient performance 
prejudiced the outcome, i.e., the defendant’s conviction and sentence, 
not just his procedural choice of whether to plead guilty or go to trial; 
and (3) to remedy a Strickland violation, a court may order a prosecutor 
to reoffer an earlier plea offer. A fourth point pertains to prophylactic 
reform, namely, the Court’s suggestion that trial-level reforms to the 
plea procedure could avoid or ameliorate ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims.113  
This section discusses these doctrinal points and observes how the 
Court’s Sixth Amendment analysis and focus on outcomes are relevant 
to the broader task of reframing plea adjudication.  
                                                                                                                     
 111. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384, 1386–88; Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1410. 
 112. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1390; Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1410. 
 113. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1390 (arguing that the “prosecution and the trial courts may adopt 
some measures to help ensure against late, frivolous, or fabricated claims after a later, less 
advantageous plea offer has been accepted or after a trial leading to conviction” (quoting Frye, 
132 S. Ct. at 1408–09) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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1.  Delinking Strickland and Due Process 
a.  Claiming Strickland, Not Hill 
The defendants’ claims in Lafler and Frye were patterned not on 
Hill, but on Strickland, which the Court applied generally to claims of 
deficient counsel before trial. Hill permitted a defendant to claim his 
plea invalid because, absent attorney error, he would have gone to 
trial.114 Neither Lafler nor Frye fit that mold because neither of the 
defendants in these cases claimed his conviction was invalid and neither 
sought trial as a remedy. Instead, each of the defendants in Lafler and 
Frye complained that he fared worse, in terms of his conviction and 
sentence, due to his defense counsel’s deficient advice during the plea 
stage. 
Lafler and Frye presented an opportunity to confront Hill’s limited 
scope, which the Supreme Court had no occasion to do in Padilla v. 
Kentucky,115 its 2010 landmark decision. In Padilla, a noncitizen pled 
guilty in state court to a felony drug charge that would result in 
mandatory deportation.116 His lawyer erroneously told him before 
pleading guilty “that he did not have to worry about immigration 
[consequences].”117 The defendant in Padilla alleged under Hill that, but 
for his attorney’s incorrect advice, he would have not pled guilty and 
would have insisted on going to trial.118 The Court agreed that defense 
counsel’s performance was deficient, and remanded on prejudice under 
Hill.119 The Court’s opinion implied more broadly, however, that Hill 
was not a perfect fit for most defendants since immigration 
consequences are relevant to negotiating a better plea.120 Effective 
defense counsel would negotiate to avoid or reduce the risk of 
deportation, which in turn would create a powerful inducement to plead 
guilty.121 Though Padilla mentioned these plea-bargaining dynamics, it 
stuck to a traditional Hill framework.  
                                                                                                                     
 114. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S 52, 58–59 (1985). 
 115. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
 116. Id. at 1477–78 (referring to a guilty plea for “transportation of a large amount of 
marijuana”). 
 117. Id. at 1478 (quoting Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008), 
rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1473) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 118. See id. See generally id. at 1485 n.12 (discussing the relationship between Strickland 
and Hill in reference to Padilla). 
 119. See id. at 1486–87. 
 120. See id. at 1486 (“By bringing deportation consequences into this [criminal] process, 
the defense and prosecution may well be able to reach agreements that better satisfy the interests 
of both parties.”). 
 121. Id. 
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Lafler and Frye, by contrast, required the Court to consider how 
Strickland would apply to claims that did not fit the Hill mold.122 In 
Frye, defense counsel failed to communicate a favorable plea offer to 
the defendant (Frye), who later entered a less favorable plea without an 
agreement.123 Frye was charged with driving with a revoked license, 
pled guilty to the felony charge, and received a three-year sentence.124 
Unknown to Frye, the prosecutor had sent a letter to his counsel 
containing two plea options, one of which would have reduced the 
charge to a misdemeanor with a recommendation of a ninety-day jail 
sentence.125 Frye’s counsel did not tell him about the offers, which 
expired before he pled guilty without a plea agreement.126 Frye later 
claimed that he would have accepted the offer to plead to a 
misdemeanor had he known about it.127 
In Lafler, the defendant (Cooper) claimed that he would have 
accepted a plea instead of going to trial, which led to a much harsher 
sentence.128 Cooper’s charges, including assault with intent to murder, 
arose from a shooting.129 Before trial, Cooper rejected two plea offers, 
including one for a recommended sentence of fifty-one to eighty-five 
months, based on his counsel’s erroneous advice that the prosecutor 
could not prove at trial he had the requisite intent to kill.130 The jury 
convicted the defendant on all counts and he was sentenced to a 
mandatory term of 185 to 360 months.131 All parties agreed that 
Cooper’s counsel gave him bad advice, so the issue was whether 
Cooper could establish Strickland prejudice despite the valid jury 
verdict.132  
The Court analyzed both claims under Strickland, which required the 
Court to determine if “the outcome of the proceeding would have been 
different with competent advice.”133 Lafler presented the opposite fact 
situation from Hill, the Court reasoned, because Cooper alleged that the 
ineffective assistance “led not to an offer’s acceptance but to its 
                                                                                                                     
 122. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384–85 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 
1405–06 (2012). 
 123. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1404. 
 124. Id. at 1404–05. 
 125. Id. at 1404. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 1405.  
 128. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1386–87 (2012). 
 129. Id. at 1383. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 1384. 
 133. Id. (citing Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1410 (2012)) (quoting Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). 
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rejection.”134 And in Frye, “[t]he challenge [was] not to the advice 
pertaining to the plea that was accepted but rather to the course of legal 
representation that preceded it with respect to other potential pleas and 
plea offers.”135  
The Court’s broad restatement of Strickland clarified that it governs 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at the plea-bargaining stage, 
regardless of whether the defendant is ultimately convicted by guilty 
plea or at trial. Strickland provides the constitutional standard for all 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims (of which Hill is just one 
application) and, though a rigorous standard, it is sufficiently flexible to 
encompass many manifestations of deficient performance, like those 
presented in Lafler and Frye. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
can now take at least three forms, provided the Strickland test is 
satisfied: (1) the defendant pled guilty but wanted a trial (Hill), (2) the 
defendant pled guilty but wanted a different plea (Frye), and (3) the 
defendant was convicted at trial but wanted to plead guilty (Lafler). 
b.  Strickland as an Independent Basis for Relief 
Lafler and Frye also recognize that Strickland provides an 
independent basis on which to challenge a guilty plea under the Sixth 
Amendment. These cases provide that denial of the Sixth Amendment 
right to effective assistance of counsel is grounds to challenge a 
conviction, even if the conviction resulted from a reliable guilty plea or 
fair trial. Professor Justin F. Marceau hails Lafler and Frye as 
commencing “a new era in the jurisprudence of the Sixth 
Amendment.”136 He argues that Lafler and Frye recognize that 
Strickland does not merely provide a remedy for incompetent lawyering 
at the trial and sentencing stages, but permits claims addressing 
prejudicial ineffective assistance of counsel during the pre-trial phase, 
including plea-bargaining.137 The significance for guilty pleas is 
twofold. First, Frye places Sixth Amendment analysis of guilty pleas on 
the same plane as due process analysis under Boykin. Second, Lafler 
emphasizes that in today’s world, plea-bargaining is as critical as trial or 
sentencing in determining the outcome of the case.  
Frye establishes that a guilty plea can be set aside based purely on 
Sixth Amendment grounds. Before Frye, Strickland played the role of 
helper doctrine in assessing the validity of a guilty plea.138 Frye severs 
that link. In Hill and Padilla, the defendants claimed that defense 
counsel’s incompetent advice led them to plead guilty without full 
                                                                                                                     
 134. Id. at 1385. 
 135. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1406. 
 136. Marceau, supra note 4, at 1161. 
 137. Id. at 1162–63. 
 138. See supra Section I.B. 
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knowledge of the consequences.139 In Hill, the Court adopted the theory 
that “the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s 
advice” was reasonable.140 In other words, the Sixth Amendment 
(Strickland) violation, if proven, resulted in a due process violation (an 
invalid plea).141 In Frye, there was no due process claim since Frye did 
not challenge the validity of the accepted guilty plea, but instead 
challenged the ineffective assistance of counsel that preceded it.142 In 
Frye, the Sixth Amendment analysis stands on its own, not as an 
adjunct to due process analysis.143 
Frye puts the Sixth Amendment on equal footing with due process as 
a basis for challenging guilty pleas, but, unlike Boykin, it fails to dictate 
new procedural safeguards.144 After Frye, courts must assure that guilty 
pleas satisfy both due process and Sixth Amendment concerns since 
either might provide a basis to set aside a guilty plea. The Court in 
Boykin intended the plea canvass to satisfy due process concerns and 
preclude collateral challenges.145 Courts have a constitutionalized script, 
based on Boykin, to assess whether a guilty plea satisfies due process.146 
But, as in Frye, the same conviction might be vulnerable to collateral 
attack under Strickland if the defendant experienced prejudicial 
ineffective assistance of counsel before the guilty plea. The current plea 
canvass requirement is not designed to probe Sixth Amendment 
concerns, like whether counsel provided effective assistance. As 
discussed below, the Court suggested that trial courts might develop 
safeguards to cure some errors, such as the failure to communicate an 
offer.147 For now, Frye does not constitutionalize such reforms in the 
way that Boykin did. 
Lafler reinforces that the Strickland analysis is independent from the 
validity of the conviction. In Lafler, the defendant (Cooper) was 
                                                                                                                     
 139. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 53 
(1985). 
 140. Hill, 474 U.S. at 56 (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). 
 141. See id. at 60 (rejecting the defendant’s claim because he failed to allege that 
ineffective assistance of counsel caused him to choose the guilty plea over trial). 
 142. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1404, 1409–10 (2012). 
 143. See id. 
 144. See supra Section I.A. 
 145. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243–44 & n.7 (1969). 
 146. TROY K. STABENOW, WEST’S FEDERAL FORMS: DISTRICT COURTS—CRIMINAL § 84:45 
(2012) (providing a script for a plea before a magistrate judge). But see United States v. Ward, 
518 F.3d 75 (1st Cir. 2008) (“While we recognize that no particular form or script is required 
and that state courts have considerable leeway to establish a record in whatever reasonable 
manner they see fit, Boykin established that the record of a guilty plea must affirmatively 
disclose that the defendant made his plea intelligently and voluntarily.” (quoting Hanson v. 
Phillips, 442 F.3d 789, 800 (2d Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 147. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408–09. 
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convicted at trial and did not challenge the validity of the verdict.148 The 
state and the Solicitor General argued that since “the sole purpose of the 
Sixth Amendment [was] to protect the right to a fair trial,” which 
Cooper received, “[e]rrors before trial . . . are not cognizable . . . unless 
they affect the fairness of the trial itself.”149 The Court rejected as too 
narrow the notion that a valid verdict “wipes clean any deficient 
performance by defense counsel during plea bargaining.”150 The Court 
stated that while a defendant may not be entitled to a plea bargain, he is 
entitled to effective assistance of counsel in considering any plea 
bargain offered by the prosecutor.151 The Sixth Amendment protects 
that right and defense counsel’s incompetent advice interfered with that 
right: “[H]ere the question is not the fairness or reliability of the trial but 
the fairness and regularity of the processes that preceded it . . . .”152 As 
Professor Marceau argues, Lafler established the right to effective 
assistance of counsel “as valuable for its own sake, and not merely as an 
adjunct to the fair trial right.”153 
Lafler and Frye establish that the Sixth Amendment right to the 
effective assistance of counsel provides an independent source of 
authority to challenge a conviction, whether by guilty plea or trial, 
where incompetent counsel’s advice during plea-bargaining prejudiced 
the outcome.  
2.  Measuring Prejudice Based on Outcomes 
The Court in Lafler and Frye has accorded substantive outcomes a 
new, constitutional relevance in two significant ways. Substantive 
outcomes refers here to the charges of conviction and the sentence 
imposed as a result of the guilty plea or trial verdict. First, for purposes 
of analyzing Strickland, substantive outcomes provide a concrete, 
workable measure of prejudice. Second, outcomes analysis reflects that 
plea-bargaining is about negotiating the sentence. The Court’s 
application of outcome-based prejudice analysis reinforces that pleas, 
not trials, are the norm and that prior plea offers within the case and the 
local going (market) rate for pleas in the jurisdiction provide relevant 
yardsticks for assessing prejudice. 
The Court’s prejudice analysis in Lafler and Frye focused on the 
substantive outcome of the cases.154 This focus is faithful to Strickland’s 
                                                                                                                     
 148. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1383 (2012). 
 149. Id. at 1385. 
 150. Id. at 1388. 
 151. Id. at 1384, 1387. 
 152. Id. at 1388. 
 153. Marceau, supra note 4, at 1216. 
 154. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1411 (2012) (remanding for a determination of 
whether there was a reasonable likelihood that the trial court would have accepted the earlier 
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prejudice test, which turns on a different result. In Hill, prejudice turned 
on a procedural-choice: whether, with competent counsel, the defendant 
would have opted for trial instead of pleading guilty.155 Though this was 
the correct yardstick for assessing prejudice in Hill, the Court explained, 
it is not the “sole means for demonstrating prejudice arising from the 
deficient performance of counsel during plea negotiations.”156 The 
prejudice claimed in Lafler and Frye was the defendant’s missed 
opportunity to accept a favorable plea outcome.157 The Court considered 
what difference counsel’s incompetenc made in the outcome of the case. 
Prejudice can be shown, the Court stated in Lafler, “if loss of the 
plea opportunity led to a trial resulting in a conviction on more serious 
charges or the imposition of a more severe sentence.”158 In Frye, 
procedural factors influencing the plea also played a role.159 In Frye, the 
favorable plea offer lapsed due to counsel’s deficient performance and 
Frye was arrested (again and for the same offense) before he pled 
guilty.160 So, there was a risk that the prosecutor would have withdrawn 
the original offer or that the court would not have accepted it.161 To 
prevail on his Strickland claim, Frye needed to prove “a reasonable 
probability that the end result of the criminal process would have been 
more favorable by reason of a plea to a lesser charge or a sentence of 
less prison time.”162  
The outcome orientation of Lafler and Frye reflects that the 
sentence, not guilt, drives plea-bargaining. By focusing on outcomes, 
these cases adjust doctrine based on the fact that ours is “for the most 
part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”163 So, while the verdict 
may properly be the focus of prejudice analysis in trial cases, most 
defendants plead guilty, and deficient counsel impacts their sentence, 
that is, the amount of jail or prison time they receive.164 Sentencing 
differences are easy to identify and offer a concrete measure of whether 
the defendant was worse off due to incompetent counsel. The 
sentencing consequences stemming from a different conviction may be 
                                                                                                                     
plea offer); Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 
(1984)). 
 155. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). 
 156. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1409–10. 
 157. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384–85; Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1409. 
 158. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1387. 
 159. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1409–11. 
 160. Id. at 1404. 
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 163. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388. 
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1909, 1912 (1992) (“To a large extent, this kind of horse trading determines who goes to jail and 
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obvious in some cases, such as where the defendant could have pled to 
an offense that is a misdemeanor, has a lower sentencing range (or 
statutory cap), is probationary, or would yield different immigration 
consequences. In the wake of Lafler and Frye, defendants may have 
difficulty proving their counsel was deficient, but the requirement for 
prejudice—proving a reasonable probability of a lesser offense or less 
severe sentence—is at least clear.165 
With outcomes in mind, the Court revisited the harsh trial penalty 
using a Strickland lens. The trial penalty reflects a two-tiered system in 
which defendants get the “going rate” by pleading guilty or risk a more 
severe sentence by going to trial.166 The Bordenkircher Court approved 
the use of aggressive charge-bargaining to induce guilty pleas (the 
carrot) and facilitate the trial penalty (the stick).167 In Lafler and Frye, 
the Court instead showed a preference for sentences that are in line with 
the prevailing punishment for similar conduct. Severe sentencing laws, 
the Court acknowledged, “exist on the books largely for bargaining 
purposes,” and may exceed what Congress or the prosecutor deems 
appropriate for the crime.168 Since 94%–97% of defendants plead guilty, 
the negotiated plea sentence is what the defendant would have received 
in the “ordinary course,” absent deficient counsel.169 In Lafler and Frye, 
the history of plea offers in each of these cases supplied this 
information.170 For example, in Lafler the defendant claimed that absent 
counsel’s errors, “he would have accepted a plea offer for a sentence the 
prosecution evidently deemed consistent with the sound administration 
of criminal justice” instead of the harsher sentence—“3½ times more 
                                                                                                                     
 165. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Proving Prejudice for Ineffective Assistance Claims After 
Frye, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 147, 147 (2012) (suggesting that Frye increased the prejudice the 
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 166. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. 
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and accompanying text.  
 168. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (quoting Barkow, supra note 66, at 1034) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also Bibas, supra note 20, at 154–55 (discussing the majority’s reasoning in 
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severe”—that he received after trial.171  
Writing in dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia protested the majority’s 
“outcome-based test for prejudice.”172 The Sixth Amendment, Scalia 
argued, “is concerned not with the fairness of bargaining but with the 
fairness of conviction.”173 Justice Scalia objected that the majority was 
constitutionalizing plea-bargaining rather than testing the validity of an 
accepted plea.174 Because the constitution provides no right to plea-
bargain, he maintained, no constitutional violation could arise from a 
lost opportunity to accept a plea offer.175 In contrast, the majority’s 
approach is more practical, less formalistic, and more attuned to how 
plea-bargaining impacts every case, not just those resulting in a guilty 
plea.176 
The majority’s outcomes-based analysis reflects, more broadly, that 
plea-bargaining encompasses all aspects of adjudication.177 The 
dissenters’ procedural-based approach features guilt adjudication as an 
isolated, in-court event, divorced from charging and sentencing.178 In 
fact, as the majority acknowledges, these phases get absorbed 
informally in the “horse trading” of plea-bargaining, in which charge- 
and sentence-bargaining drive negotiations.179 Further, none of this 
happens in court. Instead, plea-bargaining occurs privately without 
“formal court proceedings” or “judicial supervision.”180 Lafler and Frye 
acknowledge that plea-bargaining is a critical phase in every case, 
whether the conviction is obtained by guilty plea or trial verdict, and, 
unlike other critical phases, plea-bargaining is informal, off-the-record, 
and occurs outside court. 
In addition to establishing that plea outcomes (not post-trial 
sentences) are the norm, the Court in Lafler made the important 
assumption that trial courts know the “going rate” for plea bargains in 
their jurisdictions.181 If this assumption is accurate, a trial judge is well 
                                                                                                                     
 171. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1386–87. 
 172. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1412 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 173. Id. at 1414. 
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positioned to reject a plea if she suspects ineffective assistance of 
counsel has distorted the result. And if the plea is later the focus of a 
Strickland claim in post-conviction proceedings, the court could rely on 
the local “going rates” as a key factor in analyzing prejudice.182  
3.  Remedying and Preventing Lawyer Incompetence 
The Court suggested in Lafler that separation of powers concerns 
may need to yield to the Court’s emerging Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence. Though the traditional remedy for a Strickland claim is a 
new trial, this obviously would not have fixed the problem in Lafler 
since the defendant’s goal was to restore the earlier plea offer. In Lafler, 
the Court suggested that a prosecutor might be required to reoffer the 
earlier plea offer to remedy a Sixth Amendment violation.183 Charging 
is a prosecutorial function, so it is rare for the Court to force a 
prosecutor’s hand on charging.184 Constitutional protections, such as 
equal protection and due process, limit prosecutorial discretion but are 
difficult to enforce.185 Lafler suggests that the Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel also limits prosecutorial discretion at 
least at the remedial stage. 
The Court in Lafler considered two remedial pathways: resentencing 
and reoffering a plea bargain.186 It stated, “Sixth Amendment remedies 
should be narrowly ‘tailored to the injury suffered from the 
constitutional violation and should not unnecessarily infringe on 
competing interests.’”187 If, absent the error, a defendant would have 
received a lesser sentence for the same offense, a court could remedy 
that error at resentencing.188 But the remedy is more complicated if, 
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absent the error, the defendant would have pled to a lesser charge, or if 
the court lacks discretion, due to a mandatory sentencing statute, to 
adjust the sentence.189 To remedy a constitutional violation in those 
circumstances a court may “require the prosecution to reoffer the plea 
proposal.”190 Thus, a court may force a prosecutor to reoffer an earlier 
plea offer to remedy a specific Sixth Amendment violation.  
The Frye Court suggested trial-level reforms to prevent ineffective 
assistance of counsel in plea-bargaining.191 One way to ensure the 
defendant is well-informed of his plea options, the Court said, is to put 
more on the record at the guilty plea proceeding or before trial—to 
include, for example, the defendant’s understanding of the process that 
led to the plea, “the advantages and disadvantages of accepting it, and 
the sentencing consequences or possibilities that will ensue.”192 Some 
jurisdictions follow another tactic: Plea offers are put in writing and 
made part of the record before a final plea or trial so any 
miscommunications can be aired and possibly remedied at the trial court 
level.193 These improvements would aid the flow of information 
between the defendant, prosecutor, and judge. 
Lafler and Frye set the stage for reforms designed to identify or 
avoid ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial level, which also 
could prevent or curb related ineffective assistance of counsel claims in 
post-conviction. 
D.  Toward Outcome-Based Regulation 
Lafler and Frye begin a new era of plea-bargaining regulation under 
the Sixth Amendment, in which outcomes are a key feature. The 
Supreme Court has recognized that plea-bargaining is a critical phase of 
nearly every case, since so few cases go to trial. Strickland has gained a 
new independence, so that it stands on its own and is not merely an 
adjunct to ensure due process (in the guilty phase) or a fair trial. The 
Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel provides a 
separate, cognizable basis to challenge a conviction, even if the in-court 
adjudication is valid. Importantly, the prejudice test from Lafler and 
Frye is outcome-based: The defendant must show that absent deficient 
counsel, he would have received a shorter sentence or less serious 
                                                                                                                     
Strickland violation). 
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conviction.  
As this robust Sixth Amendment jurisprudence has been evolving, 
separation of powers concerns have been muted. A primary justification 
for the Court’s hands-off approach to plea-bargaining is that prosecutors 
control charging, so the Court has not regulated aggressive charge 
bargaining and threats in the plea-negotiation phase that are intended to 
induce guilty pleas. The Court’s attitude about the trial penalty—the 
severe sentence risk of going to trial—may also be shifting. The Court 
regards plea-based sentences as the norm and a better yardstick for what 
prosecutors deem fair. And, at least at the remedial phase, the 
prosecutor may be ordered to reoffer or recharge an offense to remedy a 
Sixth Amendment violation.  
Finally, though Lafler and Frye address Sixth Amendment 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the post-conviction phase, 
trial courts will serve as the locus of reform.194 Trial judges have 
specialized expertise, the Court said, in the going rate for plea bargains 
in their jurisdictions.195 And trial-based reforms may play a significant 
role in regulating plea-bargaining by improving representation and 
catching ineffective assistance of counsel before the judgment is final. 
Even in post-conviction, trial judges familiar with local plea-bargaining 
will identify instances in which prejudice can be established. 
II.  RETHINKING APPROACHES TO REFORM 
Lafler and Frye shift the paradigm for regulating guilty plea 
adjudication on several different scales. They recognize that conviction 
by guilty plea is the overwhelming norm, as has been true for decades. 
Lafler and Frye embrace a broad and flexible approach to the Sixth 
Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel and recognize 
that trial court procedural reforms can prevent violations. And while the 
right to counsel is procedural, the Court’s emergent prejudice analysis 
underscores that outcomes are key to identifying and remedying Sixth 
Amendment violations. Part III of this Article proposes that courts can 
implement an outcome-based approach to monitoring plea-bargaining 
that integrates constitutional concerns into the plea-bargaining market. 
To set the stage for that proposal, this Part explores how constitutional 
norms and plea-bargaining fit together.  
Several features of plea-bargaining, including its highly adaptive 
culture and blending of procedural and substantive law, make it 
particularly challenging for courts to regulate. Proposals to reform plea-
bargaining oversight tend to fall into two categories: some build on the 
                                                                                                                     
 194. See Bibas, supra note 20, at 167–69 (suggesting that various actors, including 
legislatures, bar organizations, and prosecutors, could reform the trial court process). 
 195. Frye, 132 S Ct. at 1410 (“It can be assumed that in most jurisdictions prosecutors and 
judges are familiar with the boundaries of acceptable plea bargains and sentences.”). 
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market model, while others insist on the need for constitutional norms 
or procedures. There is a natural tension between these approaches 
because the market tends to convert procedural rights into bargaining 
chips that defendants may use, through waiver, to purchase better 
outcomes. A central question is whether courts can meaningfully check 
the market to ensure constitutional norms, such as accuracy, fairness, 
and proportionality. This proposal envisions courts monitoring 
outcomes as a check against prosecutorial advantage and deficient 
counsel. 
A.  Plea-Bargaining Eats Everything 
Regulating plea-bargaining is a complex task because it blends 
criminal adjudication, a thicket in its own right, with market-based 
negotiation. History has shown that plea-bargaining is forceful and 
adaptive and that it has evolved and grown organically.196 Institutional 
actors adapt to plea-bargaining, and plea-bargaining adapts to changes 
in criminal law and procedure.197 As a practical matter, any proposal to 
regulate plea-bargaining must be contemplated in terms of how it will 
be absorbed into and manipulated by the plea-bargaining.198 Plea-
bargaining will continue to thrive regardless of the form of regulation; 
the question is whether effective regulation can be designed to improve 
the accuracy and fairness of the plea-bargaining market. 
1.  The Adaptability of Plea-Bargaining 
That plea rates have been remarkably steady amid other changes in 
criminal law and procedure suggests that plea-bargaining is adaptive in 
two related ways. Plea-bargaining incorporates changes in criminal law 
and procedure while consistently generating agreements. And 
institutional players adapt to the practice of plea-bargaining based on 
independent but often reinforcing interests.  
Several scholars have traced the rise and entrenchment of plea-
bargaining over the past century.199 Though plea-bargaining was not 
widely practiced before the late 1800s, it blossomed at the turn of the 
                                                                                                                     
 196. See Fisher, supra note 20, at 1019–20 (noting examples of bargaining in the English 
courts during the eighteenth century in which victims would sometimes accept cash payments in 
exchange for abandoning prosecution). 
 197. Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7–10 
(1979); see, e.g., id. at 891 (noting that “charge bargaining appeared almost as soon as a public 
prosecutor found he had the power to accomplish it”).  
 198. See Bibas, supra note 20, at 173 (praising Lafler and Frye because they “reinforce the 
actors’ incentives and customary dispositions rather than attempting to rewire them”). 
 199. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 197; Fisher, supra note 20; Lawrence M. Friedman, 
Plea Bargaining in Historical Perspective, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 247 (1979). 
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century and was well established by the 1920s.200 By 1925, almost 90% 
of convictions in federal court were obtained by guilty plea201 and that 
rate remained steady until the early-1990s.202 Today, 94% of felony 
state convictions are obtained by guilty plea, with even higher rates in 
the federal system.203 Long before Lafler and Frye, the Supreme Court 
acknowledged that the vast majority of cases are resolved by guilty 
plea.204  
Plea-bargaining readily absorbs changes in law and procedure. 
Adjustments to the legal rights of defendants may significantly impact 
the substance of negotiations, but the basic calculations of risk 
avoidance on both sides remain. Professor Albert W. Alschuler 
correlated the rise in guilty plea convictions in the 1920s with the 
expansion of substantive criminal law in the early part of the twentieth 
century, including federal prohibition.205 The practice flourished in 
urban counties and involved corrupt practices on all sides, with police 
officers, plea “fixers,” magistrates, and punishment-based pricing by 
defense lawyers all in the mix of bargained-for convictions.206 
In plea-bargaining, procedural rights intended to protect the 
defendant, check executive power, and assure accurate results are 
                                                                                                                     
 200. Alschuler, supra note 197, at 5–6 (sketching this history); id. at 27 (documenting that 
in urban jurisdictions in Virginia, guilty plea convictions accounted for half of all convictions in 
1917 and three-quarters of all convictions by 1927). For more detailed treatment of the early 
history of plea-bargaining, see generally id. at 7–26.  
 201. Id. at 27. By contrast, from 1908–1915, about 50% of convictions in federal court 
were by guilty plea. 
 202. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 105, tbl. 5.22.2010, 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5222010.pdf (providing information for federal courts 
from 1945–2010 that shows guilty plea rates increased rapidly during 1991–1999 to new highs, 
and continued increasing, though more slowly, during 2000–2010). 
 203. Id. tbl. 5.24.2010, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5242010.pdf (reporting that 
guilty pleas resolved over 97% of convictions in federal criminal cases in 2010); id. tbl. 
5.46.2006, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5462006.pdf (reporting that 94% of state 
felony convictions in 2006 resulted from guilty pleas). 
 204. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 
1407 (2012); Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010); Brady v. United States, 397 
U.S. 742, 752 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 n.7 (1969); cf. Bordenkircher v. 
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 361–62 (1978) (acknowledging the importance of the guilty plea in the 
criminal justice system). 
 205. Alschuler, supra note 197, at 32 (observing that, in 1912, half of Chicago defendants 
were arrested for crimes that did not exist twenty-five years earlier and that the Wickersham 
Commission reported that federal prohibition had created a high-volume guilty plea machinery 
in federal courts); see also Fisher, supra note 20, at 917–19 (arguing that plea-bargaining started 
with the development of liquor laws and the resultant massive expansion of criminal law for 
relatively victimless crime, then spread to murder and eventually to all parts of the criminal 
code). 
 206. Alschuler, supra note 197, at 24–26. 
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converted to bargaining chips within the plea process.207 This is so 
because the government may seek to extract a price for a defendant 
exercising procedural rights; conversely, a defendant is able to gain a 
better outcome by forgoing procedures. The procedural rights revolution 
of the 1960s increased judicial oversight of criminal adjudication in the 
trial court and on appeal.208 With increased constitutional protections, 
defendants enjoyed greater access to counsel and were afforded 
remedies for constitutional violations.209 These developments expanded 
procedural protection for defendants and gave prosecutors an additional 
incentive to bargain.210 Just as a factually weak case would enable the 
defendant to negotiate for a better deal, the defendant could also trade 
his procedural rights—such as the right to move for suppression of 
illegally seized evidence or warrantless arrest, the right to jury trial, or 
the right to appeal.211 With a guilty plea, the prosecutor could avoid the 
risk of not having a viable case to bring (due to suppression of 
evidence), losing his case (due to acquittal), or having a conviction 
reversed on appeal (due to pretrial or trial error).212 Because of the way 
protections for defendants get incorporated into the plea bargains, some 
academics are cautious about increasing the number of rights or judicial 
controls that will, in short order, have a neutral or deleterious impact on 
defendants who exercise them.213 
Prosecutors strengthened their bargaining advantage in the 1980s as 
substantive legal changes gave them the upper hand and pushed plea 
rates even higher. Prosecutors attained greater negotiating power in the 
courtroom under tough drug, mandatory minimum sentence, habitual 
                                                                                                                     
 207. Barkow, supra note 66, at 996–97 (stating that, under plea-bargaining, “prosecutors 
are allowed to put a price on the defendant’s exercise of the judicial check, which is a key 
element in the separation of powers”). 
 208. Alschuler, supra note 197, at 38–40 (describing the impacts of the “due process 
revolution” on plea-bargaining). 
 209. See McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3044 n.28 (2010) (summarizing the 
incorporation of constitutional criminal rights to the states); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 
27 (1972) (noting that the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation is applicable to the states); 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (incorporating the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel to the states); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 346–50 (1961) (affirming the constitutional 
origins of the rules excluding evidence that was obtained without a warrant from criminal trials). 
 210. Alschuler, supra note 197, at 38. 
 211. See Nancy J. King & Michael E. O’Neil, Appeal Waivers and the Future of 
Sentencing Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 209, 250 (2005). 
 212. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978) (holding by implication that, except 
in cases of reversal based on insufficiency of the evidence, a court of appeal reversing on 
procedural grounds will remand for a new trial). 
 213. See Fisher, supra note 20, at 1066 (“[E]very new right [conferred by the courts] 
supplied a new axis along which a bargain could be struck.”); see also Bibas, supra note 20, at 
172 (invoking the work of Professor William Stuntz, who argued that constitutionalizing the 
plea-bargaining process might have the perverse effect of harming defendants). 
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offender, and sentencing laws that constrained judicial sentencing 
discretion.214 These new laws gave defendants greater incentive to strike 
plea bargains to avoid severe sentencing consequences that flow from 
charging choices. Since the 1980s, federal plea rates have increased 
from approximately 87% to 97%.215  
Even as guilty plea rates have remained steady or increased, plea 
outcomes have become more severe. Since the 1980s, the expansion and 
aggressive enforcement of criminal laws has dramatically increased the 
number of defendants prosecuted and the lengths of prison terms 
imposed.216 Today guilty pleas occur in a high-stakes environment 
where long prison terms, severe collateral consequences, and extremely 
limited resources (such as crowded courtrooms and overburdened 
defense counsel) are common.217 In this environment, trials are 
extremely rare and can carry severe consequences. As a result, most 
defendants conclude today (as they have for decades) that conviction is 
                                                                                                                     
 214. Traum, supra note 7, at 450–51. 
 215. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 105, tbl. 5.22.2010, 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5222010.pdf. Likewise, guilty plea rates have increased 
to 95% of all state convictions. THOMAS H. COHEN & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2006, at 
10 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2193. 
 216. See Traum, supra note 7, at 430 n.38 (“The per-day incarceration rate jumped from 
133 per 100,000 in 1980 to 387 per 100,000 in 1994, and then to 762 per 100,000 in 2008.”); see 
also MARGARET WERNER CAHALAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
HISTORICAL CORRECTIONS STATISTICS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1850–1984, at 54 tbl. 3-24 (1986), 
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/pr/102529.pdf (reporting that, in the early 1980s, 
state offenders served a median of sixteen to seventeen months before first release); FRANKLIN 
E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT 120 fig. 5.1 (1991) (showing 
graphically the total prison population and rate of imprisonment from 1949–1988); Bruce 
Western & Christopher Wildeman, The Black Family and Mass Incarceration, 621 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 221, 225 (2009) (“Because the system of criminal sentencing had come 
to rely so heavily on incarceration, an arrest in the late 1990s was far more likely to lead to 
prison time than at the beginning of the prison boom in 1980.”); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, The Nation’s Prison Population Grew Almost 9 Percent Last Year (Aug. 9, 1995), 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/press/PI94.PR (reporting large increases). See generally 
PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, PRISON COUNT 2010: STATE POPULATION DECLINES FOR THE FIRST 
TIME IN 38 YEARS (2010), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/our_work_report_detail.aspx? 
id=57797. 
By 2006, the median felony sentence in state court was more than four years. Cf. COHEN & 
KYCKELHAHN, supra note 215, at 13 (“Among offenders convicted of a felony and sentenced to 
prison, the mean sentence was 49 months and the median was 24 months.”). 
 217. See Traum, supra note 7, at 429–30, 431–33, 440 (discussing long prison sentences 
and collateral consequences); Cara H. Drinan, Lafler and Frye: Good News for Public Defense 
Litigation, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 138, 139 (2012) (noting evidence that one public defender had 
no opportunity to brief 40%–50% of his clients before they pled guilty). See generally Heather 
Baxter, Gideon’s Ghost: Providing the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel in Times of 
Budgetary Crisis, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 341 (detailing the indigent defense crisis and related 
litigation). 
2014] USING OUTCOMES TO REFRAME GUILTY PLEA ADJUDICATION 857 
 
either a certainty or poses a significant risk. They plead guilty to “cut 
their losses.”218 It is a fair prediction that increased regulation of guilty 
pleas would have the potential to modify plea outcomes but would not 
likely alter plea rates. 
2.  Institutional Players and Their Incentives 
Enhancing or redefining the role of the judges in guilty plea 
adjudication may prove difficult because they are integral to supporting 
the guilty plea system. Plea-bargaining is deeply entrenched in the 
criminal courts, and its success relies on institutional players—judges, 
prosecutors, and defense attorneys—doing their part.219 For these repeat 
players, plea-bargaining collapses and displaces their traditional trial-
based institutional roles and has, over time, assigned them important 
roles in the guilty plea system.220  
In trial adjudication, the discrete tasks of charging, convicting, and 
sentencing involve different institutional players acting as checks on the 
others. In the traditional model, prosecutors charge (often with judicial 
or grand jury oversight), juries or judges convict (holding the prosecutor 
to a high burden of proof), and judges impose sentences. Even in the 
traditional trial adjudication model, prosecutors’ broad charging 
discretion is minimally checked and can dictate the outcome of the case, 
including the sentence.221 Still, the formal, discrete phases of charging, 
adjudication, and sentencing keep the prosecutor’s obligations 
transparent to the court, the defendant, and the public.222 Such 
transparency operates as a check on executive power to charge, convict, 
and imprison.223  
Plea-bargaining displaces these institutional roles and consolidates 
them, often unchecked, in the prosecutor.224 The prosecutor may 
effectively control all three functions—charging, adjudication, and 
                                                                                                                     
 218. See Fisher, supra note 20, at 1042. 
 219. BIBAS, MACHINERY, supra note 23, at 31; see also Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense 
Attorney’s Role in Plea-Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1229–30 (1975) (describing 
institutional advantages of public defenders who have better information about prosecutors and 
judges compared to retained counsel). 
 220. Alschuler, supra note 219, at 1206–08. 
 221. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (“In our system, so long as the 
prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by 
statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand 
jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.”). 
 222. See Barkow, supra note 66, at 994. 
 223. Id. Contra BIBAS, MACHINERY, supra note 23, at 31 (“In practice . . . the public and 
victims have little role in criminal prosecution and so cannot constrain prosecutors. Prosecutors 
draw their fixed salaries regardless of how satisfied victims and the public are.”). 
 224. Barkow, supra note 66, at 996–97. 
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sentencing—and thus displace the role of judge and jury.225 The 
prosecutor has wide latitude to add, reduce, dismiss, or substitute 
charges during plea-bargaining with little oversight.226 The defendant 
waives his right to trial, pre-guilt legal issues, and, often, appellate 
review.227 The entire plea is often structured around the substantive 
outcome, namely, the charge of conviction and the sentence. The 
judge’s role at sentencing is diminished, as the court may be required by 
statute to impose a particular sentence based on the charge or it may 
choose to impose the sentence contemplated by the parties because of 
its customary, supportive role in the guilty plea system.228  
Judges and defense counsel reinforce, rather than check, this 
consolidation of prosecutorial power. Defense lawyers quickly adapt 
themselves to the plea-bargaining culture in a given court and embrace 
plea-bargaining’s flexibility, expediency, and relative fairness, 
especially compared to trial.229 Their detailed knowledge of the system, 
plea bargains, and trial risks are their stock-in-trade.230 Professor 
George Fisher posits that several features of the modern criminal justice 
system, including public defender offices, either were conceived or 
evolved to support plea-bargaining as the primary mode of case 
adjudication.231  
Judges have adapted to plea-bargaining culture based on their own 
set of incentives. Historically, judges resisted plea-bargaining and later 
treated it neutrally at sentencing.232 Over time, however, judges 
cooperated in the practice through sentence-bargaining by rewarding 
defendants who pled guilty with lower sentences than those convicted at 
trial of the same crimes.233 Judges came to appreciate the many 
                                                                                                                     
 225. Id. at 994–95 (arguing that the current lack of checks on prosecutorial power in the 
criminal law is at odds with textual and historical support for separating criminal law functions 
among the three branches with judges having a strong role in enforcing that separation). 
 226. Id. at 996–97; see also Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364–65. 
 227. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). 
 228. See Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 6, at 10 (observing that most judges “rubber-
stamp[] the bargain and sentence”). In federal cases, mandatory minimum sentences apply in 
approximately 27.2% of criminal cases, subject to narrow exceptions. U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM xxvii 
(2011), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Test  
imony_and_Reports/Mandatory_Minimum_Penalties/20111031_RtC_PDF/Executive_Summary.pdf. 
 229. MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, 
AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 90–91 (1978). 
 230. Cf. BIBAS, MACHINERY, supra note 23, at 31–32. 
 231. Fisher, supra note 20, at 1063–64. 
 232. Alschuler, supra note 197, at 19–24 (noting that, historically, courts were suspicious 
of plea-bargaining, in part because of its close connection to forced confessions); Fisher, supra 
note 20, at 984 (noting that judges did not aid plea-bargaining before the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century). 
 233. Fisher, supra note 20, at 986–87. 
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advantages of guilty pleas, especially as expanded procedural 
protections generated more criminal appeals: Guilty pleas were more 
efficient, posed no risk of trial error or reversal on appeal, and virtually 
eliminated the risk of a wrongful conviction.234 Because “plea 
bargaining by its very nature hides both factual and legal error,” it 
protects the reputation of the system as a whole by affirming that the 
guilty are convicted without errors.235 Judges also embrace plea-
bargaining to manage a high caseload and curry popularity with local 
attorneys.236 In this culture, judges and prosecutors share aligned 
incentives to ensure that plea-bargaining thrives, and a corollary interest 
in avoiding jury trials.237 
Plea-bargaining has displaced and redefined the trial-based 
institutional roles of judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys, and 
collapsed the procedures that operate to check prosecutorial advantage. 
The guilty plea canvass stands as a moment of essential, direct contact 
between the court and defendant at the guilty plea hearing, but it does 
not check, or even record, the plea-bargaining process that preceded it. 
Thus, an essential challenge of reform is reframing the purpose of guilty 
plea procedures and the roles of institutional players who perform them. 
The Supreme Court’s recognition in Lafler and Frye that ours “is for the 
most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials,”238 opens the door to 
tailoring constitutional doctrine, such as Strickland, to fit this reality. 
B.  Approaches to Reform 
Critics of plea-bargaining share some common concerns but 
advocate different pathways for reform.239 Common concerns include: 
                                                                                                                     
 234. Id. at 1040–43. 
 235. Id. at 1043. 
 236. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76 
COLUM. L. REV. 1059, 1102 (1976) (describing judicial plea-bargaining); id. at 1081 (noting that 
a high level of guilty pleas might still be maintained without severely penalizing all defendants 
who are convicted after trial because defendants value the reduction in uncertainty a plea 
creates); id. at 1087–88 (noting that, in Chicago state courts, judges would state to counsel what 
the sentence would be if the defendant pled guilty); id. at 1089 (noting “the fact that the 
defendant’s sentence would be higher after conviction at trial was implicit, not explicit”); id. at 
1093 (describing how some judges had a “semi-official ‘schedule’ of penalties”). 
 237. Id. at 1102–03 (noting that plea-bargaining relieves “the administrative pressures that 
beset the prosecutors as forcefully as they beset the judges themselves”). 
 238. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012), quoted in Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 
1399, 1407 (2012). 
 239. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 219, at 1313–14 (arguing that plea-bargaining should 
be abolished in favor of jury trials); Appleman, supra note 46, at 747–50 (arguing that a 
community jury should preside over pleas); Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, 
supra note 23, at 1151–52 (advocating a consumer protection model of information 
enhancement in the plea process); Bibas, Extrajudicial Reforms, supra note 20, at 152 
(advocating a range of voluntary and rule-based reforms); Stephen J. Schulholfer, Plea 
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(1) prosecutorial control over plea-bargaining;240 (2) powerful 
incentives to plead guilty can result in conviction of the innocent, or 
negatively impact less culpable defendants;241 and (3) lack of oversight, 
transparency, and judicial review of plea-bargaining can make it 
difficult to assess whether a plea bargain is skewed by prosecutorial 
overreaching, lack of information, ineffective defense counsel, or other 
factors.242 In their approaches to reform, critics tend to fall into two 
schools: some propose injecting constitutional norms or procedures into 
the plea-bargaining process, while others propose market-enhancing 
reforms. 
The proposals discussed below come from scholars who view plea-
bargaining as an important, though flawed, method of criminal 
adjudication. At one end of the spectrum are those who would eliminate 
the practice and at the other are those who champion its virtues. 
Abolitionists maintain that plea-bargaining cannot be reconciled with 
fundamental values in criminal adjudication.243 For example, Professor 
Stephen J. Schulholfer argues for abolition of plea-bargaining on 
grounds that a neutral fact finder should determine guilt and 
punishment, defendants should not be pressured to plead guilty, and 
defendants should be represented by agents with aligned interests.244 
Champions of plea-bargaining view it as an efficient and cost-effective 
system that affords defendants an important choice.245 In this view, 
trials are costly, time-intensive, and divert scarce judicial, prosecutorial, 
                                                                                                                     
Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1979–80 (1992) (critiquing plea-bargaining and 
arguing that it should be abolished); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 164, at 1950–51 (advocating 
revision of plea-bargaining doctrine to include contract-based analysis to normalize results and 
enhance innocence sorting). 
240. Barkow, supra note 66, at 1044 (arguing that unreviewable prosecutorial discretion at 
charge bargaining “stands in sharp tension with the separation of powers”); Marc L. Miller, 
Domination and Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1211, 1252 
(2004) (arguing that mandatory federal sentencing guidelines gave federal prosecutors “virtually 
absolute power” over sentencing). 
 241. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (quoting Barkow, supra note 66, at 1034); Scott & 
Stuntz, supra note 164, at 1911 (arguing that “impediments to efficient bargain[ing] . . . . lead[ ] 
predictably to innocent defendants being offered (and taking) the same deals as guilty ones”). 
 242. Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 23, at 1125–27. 
 243. Alschuler, supra note 236, at 1061 (“Although my own view is that the institution of 
plea-bargaining can and should be abolished, the Article tentatively accepts the opposite view 
and examines how a system of plea bargaining should be structured.”); id. at 1119 (“That plea 
negotiation . . . collapses the adjudicative and sentencing functions into one is simply an 
unavoidable defect of the process.”); see, e.g., Kenneth Kipnis, Plea Bargaining: A Critic’s 
Rejoinder, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 555, 557–58 (1979) (arguing that plea-bargaining is counter to 
the ideals of the Anglo-American justice system). 
 244. Schulhofer, supra note 239, at 2009. 
 245. Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1976–78 
(1992). 
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and defense resources from other cases.246 Plea bargains offer 
defendants autonomy on an important life decision that affects their 
liberty.247 Since society protects individuals’ ability to make other 
weighty life choices, defendants must be permitted to determine the 
outcome of their own case.248  
Even proponents recognize that plea-bargaining is imperfect and 
creates incentives that compel innocent defendants to plead guilty.249 
Justice Scalia acknowledged that plea-bargaining “presents grave risks 
of prosecutorial overcharging that effectively compels an innocent 
defendant to avoid massive risk by pleading guilty.”250 But, he stated, it 
is a “necessary evil,” without which “our system of criminal justice 
would grind to a halt.”251 Others argue that the structural 
“imperfections” in plea-bargaining merely “reflect the imperfections of 
an anticipated trial.”252 If trials were perfect, the argument goes, guilty 
defendants would avoid them and innocent defendants would insist on 
them.253 Since trials are imperfect and the sentencing consequences 
after trial can be severe, defendants, even those who may be innocent or 
have a defense, opt to plead guilty to manage these risks.254 
The opinions in Lafler and Frye highlight the debate about whether 
plea-bargaining should be regulated under the Constitution and, if so, 
what reforms might be effective. The majority embraced at least a 
partial constitutional approach, holding defense counsel accountable for 
prejudicial ineffective assistance during plea-bargaining without 
dictating specific constitutional reforms.255 Justice Scalia acknowledged 
that plea-bargaining is “a subject worthy of regulation,” but not 
protected under the Sixth Amendment.256 Scholars are also divided on 
whether to rely on constitutional norms or market-based concepts to 
reform and regulate plea-bargaining.  
                                                                                                                     
 246. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970). 
 247. Easterbrook, supra note 245, at 1976–77. 
 248. Id.  
 249. Id. at 1971–72, 1975, 1978; Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, A Reply: Imperfect 
Bargains, Imperfect Trials, and Innocent Defendants, 101 YALE L.J. 2011 (1992) (noting that 
“both trials and bargains are flawed”); see also, Brady, 397 U.S. at 758 (stating that guilty plea 
convictions are “no more foolproof than full trials to the court or to the jury”). 
 250. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1397 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 251. Id. (citing Alschuler, supra note 197, at 38). 
 252. Easterbrook, supra note 245, at 1978. 
 253. Id. at 1970–72. 
 254. Id. at 1975. 
 255. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408–11 (2012) (finding counsel deficient under 
Strickland for failure to communicate plea offer and suggesting trial court and legislative 
reforms). 
 256. Id. at 1413–14 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting legislators are appropriate bodies to 
create “sub-constitutional” reforms). 
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1.  Constitutional Reformers 
One school of reformers seeks to inject constitutional norms into the 
guilty plea process. Professors Rachel Barkow and Laura Appleman 
offer different approaches to address common concerns.257 Each injects 
a traditional constitutional check on prosecutorial advantage that is 
currently missing from the process. Professor Barkow relies on judicial 
authority, while Professor Appleman proposes a “plea jury” to restore 
transparency and community involvement to criminal adjudication. 
Professor Barkow asserts that structural separation of powers 
safeguards are absent in criminal law, especially in plea-bargaining.258 
This absence is especially stark in plea-bargaining because prosecutors 
dictate the charges and often the sentence without a judicial check.259 
Professor Barkow argues, “[J]udges have become desensitized to a 
criminal justice system in which prosecutors exercise extensive judicial 
power.”260 Instead of relying on institutional checks, criminal 
adjudication relies on individual procedural rights as the primary 
(though inadequate) mechanism to prevent government overreaching,261 
and prosecutors routinely condition guilty pleas on the defendant’s 
waiver of those constitutional rights.262 Checks on prosecutorial power, 
such as the right to trial, are thus subsumed in the plea-bargaining 
process, avoiding judicial oversight.263  
Professor Barkow suggests that one way to redress this problem is to 
reframe the court’s inquiry at the guilty plea hearing. When defendants 
plead guilty, the real question should not be whether their plea is 
knowing and intelligent, “but whether there is a sufficient check on 
prosecutors’ use of the bargaining power.”264 Currently, Professor 
Barkow answers, there is no such check on the structural relationship 
between the branches.265  
Professor Barkow’s proposal redresses the problem of collapse and 
displacement of institutional roles in plea-bargaining. She reimagines 
the court at the guilty plea hearing as playing a more active role, one 
that is focused not merely on the individual process choice and related 
waiver of rights by the individual defendant (the status quo), but on a 
broader, constitutional concern of checking prosecutorial power. 
Because courts have become accustomed in the plea context to 
                                                                                                                     
 257. Barkow, supra note 66, at 994–95; Appleman, supra note 46, at 747–50. 
 258. Barkow, supra note 66, at 996–97. 
 259. Id.  
 260. Id. at 1038. 
 261. Id. at 1033–34. 
 262. Id. at 1046. 
 263. Id. at 1049. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. 
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prosecutors exercising such broad power, Professor Barkow’s proposal 
would require courts to reassert their institutional role within the guilty 
plea process.266 Professor Barkow does not detail whether this judicial 
check on prosecutorial authority would be primarily procedural in 
nature or include a substantive review of the charges, bargaining, or the 
sentence. Her proposal is more conceptual in that it contemplates that 
courts could more actively monitor guilty plea adjudication in a manner 
that is consistent with their institutional judicial role of checking 
executive power and protecting individual rights. 
Professor Appleman contemplates the creation of the plea jury as an 
alternative constitutional check on prosecutorial power. Professor 
Appleman derives the concept of a “plea jury” from the Sixth 
Amendment, which, she argues, confers a community right to jury 
trial.267A key feature of this broader community right is that it is not the 
defendant’s right to waive.268 So, Professor Appleman argues, a 
defendant’s waiver of a jury trial does not sever the community’s right 
to hear his case.269 Professor Appleman proposes that the defendant 
would allocute to the plea jury, which, with some judicial oversight, 
could decide whether to accept the plea.270 The goal would be to 
integrate plea-bargaining with “classical criminal-procedure values,” 
including voluntariness, accountability, transparency, and community 
participation,271 instead of the backroom and insider-dealing that 
characterizes plea-bargaining. Compared to current practices, a plea jury 
could be costly to implement and time-consuming for courts and 
parties.272 Defendants, who might not welcome the plea jury’s 
involvement in their case, could challenge the process or demand 
safeguards that encumber the process. Still, the proposal is valuable in 
that it seeks to inject community participation and constitutional norms 
into guilty plea adjudication. 
The proposals of Professors Appleman and Barkow share common 
threads. Both seek to integrate plea-bargaining and constitutional norms 
so that plea-bargaining better reflects deeply held, constitutional values 
about governmental power, process, and liberty. Both share the notion 
that criminal adjudication is not simply a private matter for the 
defendant and the prosecutor to resolve. Instead, checks on 
prosecutorial power and individual choice are essential to the 
constitutional design and the public’s broader interest in criminal 
                                                                                                                     
 266. Id. at 1036–38. 
 267. Appleman, supra note 46, at 736–37. 
 268. Id. at 744. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. at 734. 
 271. Id. at 768. 
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enforcement, justice, fairness, and deployment of public resources. 
Courts have an institutional, constitutional role to play even if the 
defendant admits guilt (per Professor Barkow), and the community has 
a stake (per Professor Appleman) in checking prosecutors’ power to 
charge, adjudicate, and sentence individuals.  
2.  Market-Based Reformers 
Other reformers build on the market model. Professor Stephanos 
Bibas proposes market-based reforms that build on consumer protection 
concepts, reinforce actors’ incentives, and rely on extrajudicial 
regulatory controls.273 Professor Robert Scott and the late Professor 
William Stuntz, in contrast, urged greater reliance on contract law 
concepts and remedies to increase the efficiency and fairness of plea-
bargaining.274 These proposals share the laudable feature of trying to 
identify and correct problems within the plea-bargaining market that can 
skew results, such as the information and power asymmetry between the 
prosecutor and defendant, and the risk–reward incentives that can cause 
innocent defendants to plead guilty. They differ significantly, however, 
in their view of the role that courts should play. Professor Bibas 
envisions courts on the periphery of plea-bargaining reform.275 
Professors Scott and Stuntz, by contrast, envision courts having a 
hands-on, substantive role in monitoring outcomes to ensure that plea-
bargaining is actually fair and not skewed by prosecutorial advantage or 
ineffective counsel.276  
a.  Reinforcing Shared Incentives 
Professor Bibas emphasizes the need for reforms that will enhance a 
defendant’s capacity to make a better informed decision on whether to 
accept a plea bargain.277 Professor Bibas’s significant work on plea-
bargaining describes a market that is complex,278 mostly unregulated, 279 
                                                                                                                     
 273. See Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 23, at 1117; Bibas, 
supra note 20, at 152–53. 
 274. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 164, at 1950–51. 
 275. See Bibas, supra note 20, at 152 (proposing that “nonjudicial actors (especially 
prosecutors) will do much to solve plea bargaining’s problems prospectively”). 
 276. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 164, at 1952 (observing that defense counsel is key to 
checking government overreaching); id. at 1931 (discussing fairness). 
 277. Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 23, at 1145–46. 
 278. Id. at 1120–21 (arguing that plea-bargaining is “far too complicated and opaque” for 
most defendants to fully understand the choices presented to them). 
 279. See id. at 1120; see also BIBAS, MACHINERY, supra note 23, at 30–31 (describing how 
plea-bargaining is run by insiders, professional prosecutors, and defenders, who are repeat 
players, not traditional adversaries, and their actions are “largely insulated from oversight and 
supervision” by courts, the public, or the defendants whose cases are at stake); Bibas, supra note 
14, at 79 (describing the Court’s “laissez-faire, hands-off approach” to plea-bargaining); cf. 
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and possibly ill-suited for court-led reforms.280 Unique aspects of plea-
bargaining distinguish it from other legal negotiations (or markets): the 
amount of prosecutorial control over plea offers (charges and 
sentencing), the variability of defense counsel, and informational gaps 
defendants experience in considering a plea offer.281 Bibas’s proposals 
for reform focus on three themes: (1) defendants need better, clearer 
information about their options and related consequences;282 (2) timing 
is critical because reforms must be designed to improve plea-bargaining 
when it occurs in the pretrial stage, not after the fact;283 and (3) reforms 
should focus on institutional actors’ existing incentives in the 
marketplace.284 
Consumer protection-inspired reforms, Professor Bibas argues, 
would enhance a defendant’s capacity to assess plea offers.285 A host of 
reforms could make the plea-bargaining process more transparent and 
easier for defendants to comprehend. These include requiring plea 
offers to be made in writing, making plea and trial consequences 
(including possible jail or prison time) easier to comprehend, giving 
defendants more time to consider a plea offer, and improving the quality 
of defense counsel.286 Prosecutors could explain the basis for their 
offers to the defendant and spell out likely sentencing consequences 
before the plea is accepted.287 The quality of defense counsel could be 
improved through training, use of checklists, and internal oversight.288  
Timing is critical: Reforms need to occur in the pre-plea, pretrial 
phase so that the problem of incompetent counsel is flagged before the 
conviction and sentence are final. Professor Bibas predicts that Lafler 
                                                                                                                     
Bibas, supra note 166, at 2469–86 (describing how plea-bargaining outcomes are keyed not to 
trial-outcome predictions, but a range of “structural distortions” that shape the parties’ 
bargaining incentives). 
 280. Bibas, supra note 20, at 152 (“Courts are poorly equipped to remedy woefully 
inadequate defense lawyering on their own.”); see also id. at 174 (stating that nonjudicial actors 
are “better suited” to implement plea-bargaining reforms). 
 281. See id.; cf. Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 23, at 1126–27 
(noting “psychological biases and heuristics that color defendants’ assessments of their own 
cases in plea bargaining”). 
 282. Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 23, at 1151–59. 
 283. Bibas, supra note 20, at 152–53. 
 284. Id. at 164–67; Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 23, at 1144–
46. 
 285. Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 23, at 1151–59. 
 286. Id. at 1154–58. 
 287. Bibas, supra note 20, at 167 (citing Bibas, supra note 166, at 2525) (describing 
prosecutor-led “reverse proffer sessions,” in which a prosecutor tells the defendant “how the 
government would convict the defendant,” and suggesting that prosecutors might opt to disclose 
more information in this unofficial setting than is legally required at the plea stage). 
 288. Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 23, at 1160 (suggesting 
training and the use of checklists); Bibas, supra note 20, at 168 (suggesting internal defender 
audits could “weed out the weakest lawyers”). 
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and Frye will have a limited impact in practice because, as with all 
Strickland claims, defendants face significant barriers when challenging 
their conviction and sentence collaterally, after the fact.289 Defendants 
must satisfy a demanding legal standard, and Professor Bibas suspects 
that courts may be reluctant to overturn a conviction or grant much 
relief.290 Meaningful reforms will need to be “proactive” measures 
designed to ensure that defendants get competent advice in the first 
place, that is, during the plea-bargaining stage.291 Professor Bibas 
argues that nonjudicial actors, especially prosecutors, are better 
positioned to implement reforms at the plea-bargaining stage.292 
Professor Bibas’s proposals are prosecution-centric and largely 
reinforce, rather than check, existing institutional roles in the plea-
bargaining marketplace. Observers of plea-bargaining, including 
Professor Bibas, recognize that prosecutors currently dictate plea-
bargaining without any meaningful check on their power.293 Still, 
Professor Bibas expresses confidence that prosecutors are appropriate 
engines of reform because “their interests largely align with those of 
defendants and the system” in terms of reaching fair deals and ensuring 
that convictions withstand challenges on appeal and in post-conviction 
proceedings. Defender organizations and judges share these same 
incentives, he argues, of needing to move cases quickly and eliminating 
the risk of post-judgment litigation.294 
Professor Bibas is correct about shared incentives and wise to 
contemplate reforms that “can work well because they go with the grain 
of plea bargaining, not against it.”295 The downside of this approach is 
that it reflects the status quo instead of altering it. Institutional actors 
currently share all these same incentives, that is, moving cases and 
avoiding judicial oversight, and it is precisely these shared incentives 
that facilitate guilty plea adjudication without meaningful oversight 
either before or after the fact. True, prosecutors are favorably positioned 
to affect plea-bargaining, but this is because, as the most powerful 
players in the process, they control it. Entrusting reform to prosecutors 
without building in a check on their power may place too much faith in 
                                                                                                                     
 289. Bibas, supra note 20, at 159–63. 
 290. Id. at 161–62. 
 291. Id. at 159. 
 292. Id. at 164–65, 167. 
 293. Barkow, supra note 66, at 996–97; Fisher, supra note 20, at 868; see Bibas, supra note 
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the existing market and result in insufficient will to challenge it.  
Overall, Professor Bibas’s proposal features courts as relatively 
weak actors in implementing plea-bargaining reform. This extrajudicial 
approach may reflect two different concerns. The first is a desire to 
avoid constitutionalizing the plea-bargaining process, which could stifle 
creativity and flexibility and lead to the kind of rigid procedural 
regulation that governs trial adjudication.296 The second is a desire to 
keep regulation procedural and thus avoid court intervention in the 
substance of pleas.297 Professor Bibas suggests that in Padilla the 
Supreme Court for the first time began to “regulate plea bargaining’s 
substantive calculus,” referring to the sentencing and “related collateral 
civil consequences.”298 His proposed reforms would “regulate at least 
the process if not the substance of plea bargaining.”299 Because “courts 
can do little on their own,” Professor Bibas does not foresee courts 
assuming a greater, substantive role in regulating plea outcomes.300 He 
instead foresees a mixed menu of reforms designed to enhance market 
functioning.301 
b.  Ensuring Market Prices 
Though Professors Scott and Stuntz also fashion reforms on a market 
model, they envision courts acting as market referees. Professors Scott 
and Stuntz propose that courts at the plea stage “review not process but 
outcomes.”302 This concept fits into a broader proposal that courts 
should use contract-based principles to protect defendants against 
prosecutorial advantage and defense attorney error—factors that 
interfere with the parties’ ability to negotiate a fair outcome.303 Here, 
the Article focuses on their outcomes proposal because it offers a 
market-based justification for courts to regulate the substance of pleas. 
Outcomes provide a good indicator of whether the plea market is 
working or whether ineffective counsel or prosecutor advantage is 
skewing results.304 According to Professors Scott and Stuntz, “Because 
most attorney error affects the price of the plea rather than its existence, 
                                                                                                                     
 296. See id. at 173 (criticizing the “Warren Court’s . . . command-and-control regulation”); 
Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 23, at 1152 (“[D]eveloping flexible 
nonconstitutional responses might obviate further constitutional reforms.”). 
 297. See Bibas, supra note 20, at 171 (discussing concerns of courts becoming involved in 
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 298. Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market, supra note 23, at 1117. 
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 302. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 164, at 1959. 
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most attorney error does not amount to ineffective assistance.”305 
Professors Scott and Stuntz wrote this some twenty years before Lafler 
and Frye, when Hill provided the only avenue to challenge a guilty plea 
under Strickland and required a defendant to show that with competent 
counsel he would have refused to plead guilty and insisted on going to 
trial.306 This remains true today, even after Lafler and Frye, because 
most nonegregious errors by counsel will not satisfy the Strickland 
standard.307  
Professors Scott and Stuntz argue that outcomes, not procedural 
analysis, provide a better gauge of whether the parties agreed to a fair 
“price.”308 They assert that the “difference between a good and bad 
deal” depends on (1) “knowledge of likely trial outcomes” and resulting 
sentences, and (2) “a good sense of the going ‘market price’ of the 
relevant category of crime—i.e., the sentence usually assigned after a 
guilty plea in similar cases.”309 One problem is that the repeat players 
(prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys) are well positioned to have 
such knowledge, while defendants, especially inexperienced ones, are 
not.310 Defense counsel’s knowledge about the marketplace may be the 
key factor in achieving a fair result and more important than the time 
the lawyer devoted to the case.311 In the marketplace, “bargaining skill 
depends more on knowledge of information about other cases than on 
case-specific preparation.”312  
Because judges know the marketplace, they are well positioned to 
identify plea outcomes that exceed the going rate.313 Professors Scott 
and Stuntz argue that although a “judge is in a poor position to 
supervise the bargaining process, . . . he is in a very good position to 
recognize unusually high sentences.”314 In their view, a high sentence 
should trigger judicial scrutiny—such as requiring an explanation from 
the parties—and judges might suspect that defense attorney mistake is 
to blame for the above-norm outcome.315  
                                                                                                                     
 305. Id. at 1958. 
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The approach of Professors Scott and Stuntz would give judges a 
powerful, market-based role in regulating plea-bargaining. Judges could 
use plea outcomes as an indicator for market factors, such as ineffective 
defense counsel, that negatively impact the parties’ ability to negotiate a 
fair result. Monitoring outcomes would be at once more direct and less 
intrusive than overseeing plea-bargaining, which is time-consuming and 
occurs out of court. By monitoring outcomes based on going market 
prices, courts could correct more subtle differences in attorney error that 
may separate good and bad deals, even while not rising to the level of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Indeed, Professors Scott and Stuntz 
suggest that in all cases the bargained-for sentence should operate “as a 
ceiling, but not a floor” and that “downward discretion should be 
encouraged whenever the sentence is substantially above the ‘market 
level’ in the relevant jurisdiction.”316  
The proposal of Professors Scott and Stuntz places courts at the 
center of the plea-bargaining market, with authority to shape the 
substantive (not merely procedural) outcome of the case. This approach, 
though market-based, reflects basic separation of powers concerns. It 
explicitly abandons a process-based measure of fairness and instead 
relies on “price” as a substantive measure of relative fairness within the 
marketplace. This approach is imperfect in many ways since market 
prices can be inflated, the plea-bargain market suffers from structural 
power imbalances (such as prosecutorial advantage and overburdened 
defender services) between the parties, and going rates can mask and 
oversimplify important differences in cases that could or should affect 
the substantive outcome. Professor Barkow suggests that courts at the 
plea stage should be assessing “whether there is a sufficient check on 
prosecutors’ use of the bargaining power.”317 The outcomes analysis 
proposed by Professors Scott and Stuntz is one way for courts to 
implement that inquiry. 
III.  MONITORING OUTCOMES IN THE TRIAL COURT 
Lafler and Frye could usher in a new approach to regulating guilty 
pleas that is both market-based and anchored by constitutional norms. 
These cases confirm that courts enjoy robust authority to protect a 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of 
counsel. This authority, informed by the practical realities of plea-
bargaining, could reshape courts’ role in guilty plea adjudication. This 
Part proposes that this shift in authority enables courts to play a more 
active, hands-on role in ensuring that plea-bargaining results are 
consistent with constitutional guarantees. It further proposes that courts 
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embrace an outcome-based approach to monitoring plea-bargaining that 
builds on Professor Scott and Professor Stuntz’s proposal. Instead of 
grounding this approach in contract doctrine, as they did, this Article 
justifies it on the constitutional grounds of the Sixth Amendment right 
to the effective assistance of counsel and separation of powers concerns. 
The strengths of this model are that it goes “with the grain of plea- 
bargaining, not against it,”318 is anchored by constitutional values, and 
features courts playing a meaningful institutional role in the process. 
Having courts review the substance of pleas, instead of merely 
procedural aspects, is a substantial change from current practice. But 
outcomes monitoring is justified for practical reasons because it builds 
on courts’ market expertise, can be implemented at the trial court level, 
and dovetails with courts’ traditional role of imposing a sentence.  
This Part begins by describing the constitutional and theoretical 
support for monitoring plea outcomes and then details how courts 
would implement this approach in practice. 
A.  Trial Court Authority 
Lafler and Frye lay the groundwork for trial courts to monitor plea 
outcomes based on Sixth Amendment and separation of powers 
concerns. Lafler and Frye make clear that the Sixth Amendment right to 
the effective assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings is a robust 
one that stands on its own. By delinking Sixth Amendment concerns 
from due process analysis (in the plea context) and fair trial analysis (in 
the trial context), the Court has signaled that the right to the effective 
assistance of counsel is on equal footing with (and no longer dependent 
on) other constitutional challenges to criminal convictions.319 Courts are 
charged with protecting a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to the 
effective assistance of counsel, and outcomes are a useful proxy for 
flagging instances of incompetent counsel prejudicing a case result.  
Lafler and Frye also reframe separation of powers analysis in the 
plea-bargaining context. As Professor Barkow’s work highlights, 
separation of powers principles have played a weak role in the criminal 
law, especially in plea-bargaining, with courts relying on individual 
procedural rights as a check on prosecutorial power.320 Two 
complementary assumptions justified the Court’s traditional hands-off 
approach: Defendants with counsel will protect their own interests, and 
courts must defer to prosecutorial charging decisions (provided those 
decisions are constitutional and supported by probable cause).321 
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Though courts traditionally exercised considerable power at sentencing, 
today prosecutors dictate or constrain sentencing options through their 
charging decisions.322 The plea bargain powerfully frames the 
sentencing determination and once the plea is accepted, courts may have 
very limited sentencing discretion to exercise.323 Viewing plea-
bargaining as primarily about charging and guilt ignores how the 
practice eclipses judicial sentencing authority, an important institutional 
check on executive power.  
Lafler and Frye disrupt these settled assumptions about institutional 
roles. In Lafler, the Court acknowledged that plea-bargaining is not 
merely about guilt, it is about sentencing.324 The Court recognized that 
the plea bargain frames the sentence and deficient counsel during plea-
bargaining can prejudice the substantive outcome of the case.325 The 
Court also stated that to remedy a Sixth Amendment violation, a court 
could require a prosecutor to “reoffer” an earlier plea offer.326 This 
suggests that prosecutorial discretion must yield to the need to remedy 
such right to counsel violations.  
For reforms to be meaningful and actually prevent prejudicial 
ineffective assistance claims, they must occur in the trial court and 
focus on substantive outcomes, not procedural concerns. Lafler and 
Frye set the stage for this by using outcomes, not guilt or the reliability 
of the conviction, to assess prejudice based on Strickland.327 The 
Court’s reliance on this outcomes-based prejudice test sends a strong 
message to trial courts that outcomes are key, and that normalizing 
outcomes is a way to eliminate post-conviction challenges based on 
Strickland. This is because a defendant must prove both deficient 
performance by counsel and prejudice to prove an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim based on Strickland.328 Regardless of deficient 
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performance, a Strickland claim will fail if the defendant cannot show 
prejudice, specifically that the defendant likely would have received a 
shorter sentence or been convicted of a lesser charge.329 This outcomes-
based prejudice analysis should encourage trial courts to normalize 
outcomes at the trial stage. Professors Scott and Stuntz conceptualize 
this market-based, outcomes approach based on contract and price 
principles.330 Lafler and Frye incentivize this outcomes-based approach 
based on Sixth Amendment principles. 
In Lafler and Frye, the Supreme Court provided a green light to trial 
courts to innovate reforms at the trial level, but it did not dictate a 
procedural approach.331 As Professor Bibas suggests, the Court not only 
encourages creativity but also may seek to avoid the type of rigid 
constitutionalization of procedures that are a hallmark of trial 
adjudication.332 As a practical matter, trial courts are not limited to 
adopting a procedural approach, and are free to experiment with 
outcomes monitoring. 
Outcomes monitoring also reinforces courts’ traditional sentencing 
authority. As discussed above, plea-bargaining effectively consolidates 
judicial authority, including sentencing discretion, in the prosecutor. 
Prosecutors constrain and influence sentencing discretion through 
charging choices: by charging an offense that carries a statutory 
mandatory minimum term, by charging more serious offenses to 
influence the court’s assessment of a case, and by agreeing to 
recommend a specific sentence as a term of the plea bargain.333 Though 
courts typically impose the sentence at a separate proceeding, these 
constraints on sentencing discretion often flow from the charge and 
sentencing-bargaining that occurs earlier, before guilt adjudication.334 
By the time of the sentencing hearing, it may be too late for courts to 
consider a range of sentencing options.335 Monitoring outcomes at the 
plea stage is one way for courts to assert their sentencing authority 
when it may count most, before the plea, to maintain a stake in shaping 
the final sentence.  
Monitoring outcomes at the plea stage is consistent with current 
sentencing practices. At sentencing, courts are expected to impose 
sentences that are fair and proportionate in light of individualized, 
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systemic, and comparative factors.336 A key goal of sentencing reforms 
over the past several decades has been to ensure proportionality and 
eliminate gross sentencing disparities from case to case and courtroom 
to courtroom.337 Monitoring plea outcomes could foster similar 
objectives by aligning courts’ incentives in accepting plea bargains with 
sentencing goals. Monitoring plea outcomes resituates this inquiry to an 
earlier stage or, stated differently, shifts the plea inquiry from process-
focused to outcome-focused. 
Courts have authority and incentives, especially after Lafler and 
Frye, to monitor outcomes. As Professors Scott and Stuntz suggest, 
monitoring outcomes is one way to gauge whether the plea-bargaining 
market is functioning efficiently, or whether procedural concerns, such 
as deficient counsel, are distorting negotiated results.338 Using outcomes 
as a proxy for assessing other concerns (such as deficient counsel) 
probes those issues indirectly. But this does not make the practice 
improper. To the contrary, monitoring outcomes allows the court to 
identify cases in which deficient performance may be a factor without 
formally adjudicating that issue, delving into privileged client 
communications, or engaging directly in plea-bargaining, which is 
forbidden in some courts.339 For courts to implement this modified 
approach to plea-bargaining, however, they must appreciate all that is at 
stake—guilt adjudication, sentencing implications, and right to counsel 
concerns—and have a firm grasp on the plea-bargaining marketplace. 
B.  A Blueprint for Monitoring 
In practice, courts should monitor outcomes with three principles in 
mind and target three categories of outcomes. Trial courts should aim to 
ensure the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, 
check prosecutorial authority, and guard the court’s own discretion to 
impose a just sentence that satisfies traditional sentencing goals. Trial 
courts should focus their energies on monitoring plea outcomes that are 
above market rates or contain mandatory minimum sentences. Trial 
courts should also be alert to similar concerns in cases proceeding to 
                                                                                                                     
 336. See, e.g., Traum, supra note 7, at 453–59 (discussing federal sentencing factors under 
18 U.S.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012)). 
 337. See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 308 (2004) (referring to the “salutary 
objectives” in Washington’s determinate sentencing scheme of ensuring “proportionality to the 
gravity of the offense and parity among defendants”); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (listing as a factor 
“the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who 
have been found guilty of similar conduct”). 
 338. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 164, at 1959. 
 339. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1) (forbidding the court from participating in plea 
negotiations); United States v. Davila, 133 S. Ct. 2139, 2149–50 (2013) (holding that the 
magistrate violated FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1) by advising defendant to accept a plea, and 
remanding for harmless error analysis).  
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trial.340 
A court’s inquiry should focus on three questions. First, guided by 
the Sixth Amendment, a court should ask: Is this outcome distorted by 
the defense lawyer’s incompetence, lack of skill or knowledge, or other 
failures? Sixth Amendment violations may be especially likely to occur 
where indigent defense systems are overburdened or quality of counsel 
is variable.341 Defense lawyers working in such systems, with minimal 
resources and high caseloads, face enormous pressure to get their clients 
to plead guilty without investing much in the case.342 To guarantee the 
right to the effective assistance of counsel and prevent unjust outcomes, 
courts must be alert to how such pressures or related deficiencies (such 
as a lawyer’s failure to communicate, investigate, or research) impact 
the cases in their courtrooms.  
Second, acting on separation of powers concerns, a court should ask: 
Is this outcome skewed by prosecutorial advantage, vindictiveness, or 
gamesmanship? It may be clear to the judge, for example, that some 
prosecutors are especially aggressive or play hardball in negotiations. 
Prosecutors, like defense counsel, will certainly vary. But as with 
concerns about defense counsel, courts should aim to minimize the 
prosecutor’s role as a determinative factor in shaping the outcome of the 
case.  
Finally, a court should ask: Will accepting this plea limit the court’s 
discretion to impose a fair sentence that is individually tailored to this 
defendant based on relevant sentencing factors? As discussed above, 
this inquiry merely brings sentencing into the plea calculus. Courts 
should be especially vigilant in monitoring guilty pleas that lead to 
mandatory minimum sentences, which severely constrain their 
sentencing discretion.343 Federal district courts are authorized to defer a 
plea until the presentence report is available for the court to review.344 
                                                                                                                     
340. Post-trial sentences, as in Lafler, can be the product of ineffective assistance of 
counsel in the plea phase, and are beyond the scope of this article. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. 
Ct. 1376, 1387 (2012). For more on the trial penalty, see, for example, Ronald F. Wright, Trial 
Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 84–85 
(2005).  
 341. See, e.g., Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation, 33 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 427, 444–48 (2009) (describing the proliferation of lawsuits 
alleging that indigent defense providers systematically violate the Sixth Amendment). 
 342. Drinan, supra note 217, at 139. 
 343. In a 2010 survey, federal district judges attributed mandatory minimum sentence-
charging by prosecutors as a leading cause of sentencing disparities. See U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES JANUARY 2010 THROUGH 
MARCH 2010 tbls. 1, 16 (2010), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/
Research_Projects/Surveys/20100608_Judge_Survey.pdf (reporting that 62% of judges view the 
mandatory minimum sentences as too high and, along with charging decisions, as a cause of 
sentencing disparities). 
 344. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(A) (permitting courts to accept or reject a plea or defer 
2014] USING OUTCOMES TO REFRAME GUILTY PLEA ADJUDICATION 875 
 
This allows the court (as well as the defendant) to become fully aware 
of sentencing options and consequences at the plea stage, before it is too 
late.  
To identify outlier results, courts will need to know “going rates” for 
pleas in their jurisdiction. In Frye, the Court assumed that trial courts 
are familiar with plea deals in their jurisdictions, and Professors Scott 
and Stuntz similarly argue that courts are well positioned to know 
market rates.345 If so, courts would recognize plea deals that are within 
the normal range and those that seem too high. The extent to which 
judges actually possess such knowledge is unclear, and answering this 
question would require empirical study of what knowledge judges 
actually have when accepting pleas or imposing sentences. Studies on 
sentencing disparities within the same courthouse suggest that outcomes 
vary by courtroom, and sentencing data on codefendants is not readily 
accessible.346 Thus, even if judges have acquired expertise in their own 
courtrooms, they may lack knowledge about market rates more broadly.  
A court could begin its outcome monitoring before the plea hearing 
by seeking two sources of information: the history of plea offers in the 
case and a range of data on going rates or plea results in similar cases 
within the jurisdiction. Even the most basic plea history would avoid a 
Frye problem and provide insight into how the prosecutor has valued 
the case over time. This would help the court analyze whether the 
contemplated plea bargain and sentence is tailored to the gravity of the 
defendant’s conduct and history. A plea history driven by procedural 
factors, like delays in responding to a plea offer, might flag problems 
with defense counsel similar to those that occurred in Frye.347  
Information about similar cases would inform courts on local market 
rates. Ideally, defense attorneys, prosecutors, or an arm of the court 
would maintain this data on a local basis.348 Collecting and maintaining 
data on going rates for pleas would require considerable work, but could 
                                                                                                                     
acceptance until the court has received the presentence report). 
 345. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1410 (2012); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 164, at 
1959 (referring to “going market price”). 
 346. See United States v. Garrison, 560 F. Supp. 2d 83, 84 (D. Mass. 2008) (describing 
barriers to obtaining sentencing information on related cases within the same district); Ryan W. 
Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First Look, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1, 21–23 
(2010) (analyzing inter-judge sentencing disparities from 2001 to 2008, based on sentencing 
data from the District of Massachusetts). 
 347. 132 S. Ct. at 1404 (describing problems with defense counsel). 
 348. See, e.g., Nancy Gertner, Supporting Advisory Guidelines, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
261, 275–79 (citing Michael A. Wolff, Evidence-Based Judicial Discretion: Promoting Public 
Safety Through State Sentencing Reform, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1389, 1412–15 (2008) (calling for a 
“what works” literature and data on sentencing options that reduce recidivism); Wolff, supra, at 
1412–15 (describing empirical data collected by specialized courts in order to more effectively 
sentence offenders). 
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prove extremely useful to courts, defendants, and defense counsel in 
evaluating cases, plea offers, and plea bargains. Disseminating this 
information for use in plea-bargaining could foster the core values of 
due process, transparency, proportionality, and predictability for the 
parties, the courts, and the broader public. 
Going rate data could benefit defendants and defense counsel both 
inside and outside the courtroom. By sharing this information with the 
defendant, defense counsel could help his client evaluate the plea offer 
and informally assess the counsel’s performance. Getting defendants to 
appreciate the plea benefits and trial risks is a major hurdle for defense 
counsel.349 Defendants’ ability to assess the plea offer is often impaired 
by lack of trust in defense counsel; underestimation of the likelihood of 
conviction and related penalties; and other factors, such as stress and 
mental impairment.350 Better information about plea bargains in other 
cases would be a powerful tool for defendants and their counsel to use 
when evaluating plea offers before they come to court. 
In court, a judge might use this wealth of information about the 
market to assess defense counsel’s handling of the case. For example, 
defense counsel might justify the plea or explain why the prosecutor’s 
plea offer is too high in light of the facts. Either response would likely 
expose counsel’s knowledge of the defendant’s case or the plea market 
generally, both of which are relevant to the quality of representation. In 
most cases, this interaction with counsel would allow the court to gauge 
if the plea is within the range of market rates and detect possible issues 
of ineffective counsel and prosecutorial overreaching. If the plea seems 
too high, the court could reject the plea, defer the plea hearing (pending 
further negotiations or preparation of a presentence report), or request 
more information about the case or the going rate.  
Cases proceeding to trial are ripe for outcomes monitoring. Trial 
cases are so rare, accounting for roughly 5% of convictions, that courts 
have reason to question in each one of these cases whether prosecutorial 
overreaching or ineffective assistance of counsel has contributed to the 
defendant’s decision to risk trial and with it the harsher sentence or 
“trial penalty.”351 This “trial penalty” reflects a mixture of procedural 
                                                                                                                     
 349. Blume, supra note 23, at 123. 
 350. Id. (listing factors that contributed to capital defendants’ rejection of plea offers). 
 351. See Jenny M. Roberts, Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650, 2674 
(2013) (citing Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Sentencing Shift Gives New Leverage to Prosecutors, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 25, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/26/us/tough-sentences-help-
prosecutors-push-for-plea-bargains.html (defining the “trial penalty” as the “fact that the 
sentences for people who go to trial have grown harsher relative to sentences for those who 
agree to a plea”)); see also Cynthia Alkon, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Failure to Fix Plea 
Bargaining: The Impact of Lafler and Frye, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 561, 603–04 (2014) 
(citing, inter alia, Nancy J. King et al., When Process Affects Punishment: Differences in 
Sentences After Guilty Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105 COLUM. 
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and substantive factors that influence the prosecutor to seek and the 
court to impose a more severe sentence after trial.352 As Lafler makes 
clear, however, some defendants proceed to trial, risking the trial 
penalty, because incompetent counsel caused them to reject a plea 
offer.353 Trial courts that are alert to this possibility could take steps to 
guard against it. 
To monitor outcomes before trial, courts also should require a pre-
trial history, and take additional steps to quantify the trial penalty.354 As 
in plea cases, a pre-trial history that includes any plea offers would 
ensure that earlier offers were communicated to the defendant, and 
inform the court on how the prosecution valued the case during the 
plea-bargaining phase. Ahead of a trial, this information would frame 
the trial penalty, especially if any new charges carry minimum or 
maximum penalties. Courts could take steps to quantify and cabin the 
trial penalty, so that the trial risks are clear and not disproportionate.355 
Taking these steps before trial would ensure that the trial penalty is 
transparent to the court and the defendant, which could temper the 
severity of the trial penalty. 
Though adding a data-driven component to the plea-bargaining 
process offers much utility, it also presents some risks. For example, the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines were developed using prior sentencing 
data that was analyzed to track and derive relevant sentencing factors 
based on the defendant’s conduct and history.356 This approach 
reinforced values of uniformity and predictability, and constrained 
judicial discretion, especially before 2005, when the guidelines were 
                                                                                                                     
L. REV. 959, 992 (2005) (detailing the wide range of trial penalties)). 
 352. The prosecutor may charge the case more aggressively, Richard A. Bierschbach & 
Stephanos Bibas, Constitutionally Tailoring Punishment, 112 MICH. L. REV. 397, 438 (2013) 
(describing how prosecutors threaten higher charges during plea-bargaining and, if there is no 
plea, feel compelled to follow through with them at trial); and portray the crime and the 
defendant in a more negative light than if the defendant had pled guilty, factors that may 
influence the court’s sentencing determination, see King et al., supra note 351, at 964 
(suggesting that one factor in higher sentences after jury trial is judges’ exposure to negative 
information at trial about the defendant that the judge would not have seen or heard had the 
defendant pled guilty). 
 353. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1390–91. 
 354. See Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-Based 
Ceilings, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1237, 1237 (2008) (advocating use of “plea-based ceilings” to limit 
the severity of the trial penalty). 
 355. Id. at 1237 (arguing that courts should fix the trial penalty using plea-based sentences 
as the baseline); see also Lafler, 132 S. Ct at 1387 (implying that plea-based sentences are the 
norm and post-trial sentences the exception).  
 356. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, at 4 (2012), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2012_Guidelines/Manual_PDF/Chapter_1.pdf (describing how 
initial guidelines were developed by analyzing “data drawn from 10,000 presentence 
investigations”). Advocates of evidence-based sentencing instead focus on which kinds of 
sentences actually impede future criminal behavior. See Wolff, supra note 348, at 1412–15. 
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still mandatory.357 But some have criticized the guidelines for being too 
“rigid” and impeding the ability of judges to tailor sentences based on 
individualized factors.358 In plea-bargaining, going rate information 
could be used to the same effect, by rigidly defining plea ranges, 
masking nuances that might justify different bargains for a similar 
offense, or eliminating judicial oversight for pleas that fall within the 
going rate. 
Relying on going rates to monitor outcomes at the plea stage is not 
intended to introduce a plea-bargaining version of the sentencing 
guidelines that displaces, rather than improves, judicial oversight of 
guilty plea adjudication. To the contrary, monitoring outcomes based on 
going rates is an informal method that allows courts to engage in the 
substantive content of pleas with a principled purpose. Some courts may 
already do this, but most focus, as required, on the procedural aspects of 
the plea. Outcomes monitoring invites courts to “eyeball” the plea and 
put their market expertise to work in identifying plea outcomes that 
might be distorted by ineffective counsel or prosecutorial advantage. 
Better data on pleas would enhance courts’ capacity to understand the 
plea market and monitor outcomes. 
Judicial review of pleas can incorporate baseline assumptions about 
plea-bargaining and operate as a constitutional and institutional check 
on the process. Even in a healthy market, outcomes will vary 
considerably and in ways that should not sound alarms. Each case is 
different. Well-meaning prosecutors and competent defense counsel 
reach a range of agreements. The goal is not to destroy the market, but 
to harness its strengths in order to identify factors, especially ineffective 
counsel and prosecutorial overreaching, which can impede the parties’ 
ability to negotiate fair results. This goal is both theoretical and 
practical: to provide courts a meaningful role in regulating plea-
bargaining that injects constitutional checks into the plea-bargaining 
market. 
CONCLUSION 
Lafler and Frye shift the framework for regulation of guilty pleas 
and, importantly, begin the process of reframing constitutional doctrine 
to fit our “system of pleas.” These cases establish that courts enjoy 
                                                                                                                     
357. Erik Luna, Rage Against the Machine: A Reply to Professors Bierschbach and Bibas, 
97 MINN. L. REV. 2245, 2263 (2013) (critiquing federal sentencing guidelines as “rigid” and 
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robust authority to protect defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to the 
effective assistance of counsel in plea-bargaining and remedy 
violations. While Lafler and Frye considered these doctrinal points in 
the context of post-conviction challenges under Strickland v. 
Washington, their significance is broader. They confirm that substantive 
outcomes, not just procedural values, are important to assessing and 
remedying prejudice caused by deficient counsel. These cases also 
powerfully signal that the locus of plea reform must be in the trial 
courts, where judges know the market for plea bargains and are best 
situated to identify and correct ineffective assistance before it prejudices 
the outcome.  
Lafler and Frye begin the broader task of reorienting constitutional 
doctrine to fit guilty plea adjudication in ways that are consistent with 
core constitutional values and courts’ traditional role in checking 
prosecutorial authority. Judicial monitoring of plea outcomes leverages 
the courts’ constitutional role in the plea-bargaining market, with courts 
playing a pivotal role in detecting and correcting outcomes that are 
distorted by prosecutorial advantage or ineffective counsel. This 
approach also reinforces courts’ traditional sentencing authority and 
properly directs the judicial inquiry to focus on the substantive (not 
merely the procedural) outcome of the case. The blueprint described 
here suggests how courts can implement this approach in practical 
terms. The biggest challenge will be getting courts to embrace an 
enhanced, substantive role in regulating guilty pleas, which departs 
from their current procedural approach.  
